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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the intersection of patent law and academic
science. It advances two novel claims about the internalization of
academic science within the patent system and the concomitant
evolution of “academic exceptionalism.” Historically, relations
between patent law and the university were characterized by mutual
exclusion, based in part on perceived normative conflicts between
academic culture and exclusive rights. These normative distinctions
helped inform academic exceptionalism—the notion that the patent
system should exclude the fruits of academic science or treat academic
entities differently than other actors—in patent doctrine. As
universities began to embrace patents and the nature of scientific
research evolved, however, academic science has become internalized
within the traditional commercial narrative of patent protection.
Nowadays, courts frequently invoke universities’ commercial nature
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to reject exceptional treatment for academic institutions. The twin
trends of internalization and exceptionalism have evolved again in
recent legislative patent reform. On the one hand, the interests of
academic science have become completely internalized within the
patent system to the extent that they inform general rules of
patentability applying to all inventions. On the other hand, academic
exceptionalism (which courts have rejected as a doctrinal matter) has
been resurrected in the form of special statutory carve-outs for
universities. Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this
Article concludes with recommendations for improving the patent
system’s regulation of academic science in multiple contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, Carnegie Mellon University won a $1.17
billion jury verdict in a patent infringement suit against Marvell
1
Technology Group. If the verdict withstands post-trial motions and
appeals, it will be the largest award in the history of U.S. patent
2
litigation. The case is notable not only because of the enormous
stakes involved, but also because of the identity and behavior of the
patentee—a university. Carnegie Mellon has been accused of being a
“patent troll,” an entity that amasses patents, does not manufacture
any products, and exploits exclusive rights to extract rents from

1. Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Dec. 27, 2012, at B1. The suit involved patented hard-disk technology. Id.
2. Joe Mullin, University Wins Record $1.17 Billion Verdict Against Marvell
Semiconductor, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 26, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2012/12/jury-slams-marvell-with-mammoth-1-17-billion-patent-verdict.
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innovative parties. In a broader sense, Carnegie Mellon’s suit
illustrates a remarkable transformation in universities’ relationship
with the patent system since the humble origins of academic patenting
about a century ago.
The question of how universities should fit into the patent system
is an important one, for universities possess enormous innovative
potential. In 2010, universities spent $61.2 billion on research and
development, with federal funds accounting for 61 percent of this
4
total. Academic research has produced thousands of important
5
inventions, from medicines to search engines. In fiscal year 2011,
universities received 4,700 U.S. patents, executed 4,899 licenses, and
6
received over $2.5 billion in patent-related income. Though
impressive to some, such statistics also raise concerns over the
commercialization of universities and the subordination of academic
values to financial imperatives. Indeed, the unique norms, incentives,
and missions of universities suggest that academic inventions fit
uncomfortably in a patent system predicated on exclusive rights and
profit maximization. Such considerations give rise to significant policy
questions regarding how universities should interact with the patent
system to advance academic, technological, and economic objectives.
To address this question, this Article examines the coevolution
of patent law and the university. First, integrating historical analysis
with recent doctrinal and statutory reforms, it advances a novel
descriptive theory regarding the “internalization” of academic science
within patent law. Although patents’ permeation of university culture

3. Mike Masnick, Patent Trolling Carnegie Mellon Wins What Could Be Largest Patent
Verdict Ever: $1.2 Billion, TECHDIRT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:55 AM), http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20121226/17582221493/patent-trolling-carnegie-mellon-wins-what-could-be-largestpatent-verdict-ever-12-billion.shtml.
4. Almanac of Higher Education: University Research-and-Development Spending
Financed by the Federal Government, FY 2010, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (2012),
https://chronicle.com/article/University/133233.
5. Examples include Bufferin, computer-aided design, diagnostic tests for cancer and
osteoporosis, Gatorade, Lycos, music synthesizers, stannous fluoride, Taxol (an anticancer
drug), and the “gene splicing” technique that produced the biotechnology industry. John Fraser,
Communicating the Full Value of Academic Technology Transfer: Some Lessons Learned, 1
TOMORROW’S TECH. TRANSFER 9, 10 (2009); Donald S. Siegel, David A. Waldman, Leanne E.
Atwater & Albert N. Link, Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge
from Academicians to Practitioners: Qualitative Evidence from the Commercialization of
University Technologies, 21 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 115, 118 (2004).
6. ASSOC. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS
FY2011, at 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY_2011_
Licensing_Activity_Survey&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8731.
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has attracted significant attention, this Article explores the
underappreciated, reciprocal trend of academic science’s permeation
into the core of patent law. Historically, relations between patent law
and the university were characterized by mutual exclusion, based in
part on perceived normative conflicts between academic culture and
exclusive rights. However, as universities began to embrace patents in
the late twentieth century, academic science became similarly
internalized within the patent system. These days, the content, norms,
and practices of academic science—a formerly peripheral concern for
the patent system—are frequent subjects of patent litigation and
doctrine. Contemporary patent courts, responding to institutional
changes, view universities as fully integrated into the commercial
narrative of patents. More recently, academic science has been
internalized not only in patent doctrine, but also in statute. Due to
legislative reforms and the influence of the university lobby, the
institutional interests of academic science are now hardwired in the
patent statute. Patent law regulates a significant portion of academic
activity, and universities are wielding their political influence to
regulate patent law.
Second and relatedly, this Article argues that throughout this
process of mutual internalization, “academic exceptionalism” has
evolved considerably. Academic exceptionalism stands for the
proposition that the patent system should exclude the fruits of
academic science or treat academic entities differently than other
innovative actors. It arises in part from perceived normative and
behavioral distinctions between universities and commercial, profitmaximizing entities. Throughout most of the history of the patent
system, prudential interests in keeping foundational discoveries in the
public domain as well as judicial recognition of the noncommercial
nature of university science helped contribute to academic
exceptionalism in patent doctrine. More recently, however, courts
have rejected such exceptionalism as patentable subject matter has
expanded, academic science has become more aggressive, and
universities have begun behaving more like typical commercial
entities. Turning from doctrine to statute, academic exceptionalism
has recently evolved again in the legislative context. On the one hand,
7. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Robert P. Merges, Property
Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer
1996, at 145; Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
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exceptionalism has vanished to the extent that academic interests now
inform general rules of patentability that apply to all inventions. On
the other hand, academic exceptionalism has seen a resurgence in
special legislative carve-outs that specifically benefit universities.
Third, turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article
assesses these developments and offers prescriptions for enhancing
the patent system’s regulation of academic science. This inquiry is a
complicated one, for universities interact with the patent system in
multiple ways, and the patent system is far from monolithic; it
encompasses a wide range of regulatory mechanisms exerting both
hard and soft power over entities falling within its domain. This
Article explores the tensions that arise between the twin trends of
academic internalization and exceptionalism. It observes that
academic exceptionalism is neither categorically desirable nor
undesirable but is warranted in certain contexts when treating
universities differently than other innovative entities advances
broader policy objectives related to promoting research and access to
technology. Offering several prescriptions, this Article argues against
academic exceptionalism in the general rules of patentability.
However, it argues in favor of exercising equitable discretion to
enhance access to patented university inventions in some instances
and for targeted, soft regulation of university patenting and licensing
decisions by federal funding agencies. Finally, it endorses a robust
research exception for scientific inquiry in the infringement context.
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge several
distinctions. First, in addressing university science, it is important to
distinguish individual academic scientists from the universities that
employ them. In some cases, the norms, motivations, and interests of
individual scientists can differ from those of the institutions where
they work, as illustrated in recent high-profile disputes over the
8
ownership of academic inventions. Second, universities display great
internal and external heterogeneity. Among universities, attitudes
toward patenting may differ between public versus private, secular
versus religious, and land-grant versus non-land-grant institutions.
Within a single university, high-level leadership, technology transfer
administrators, and faculty scientists may all view patents differently.
Although this Article acknowledges these distinctions, they should

8. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (holding that title to an invention initially vested in a Stanford
University scientist rather than in Stanford University).
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not obscure the commonalities that bind these constituencies
9
together. University-based, academic research is a discrete and
powerful domain of innovation that interacts with patent law in
unique and significant ways, a phenomenon that this Article explores
in detail.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explores the historical
separation of academic science and patent law, manifested both in
noncommercial university norms and academic exceptionalism in
patent doctrine. Part II explores a historical shift culminating in the
10
late twentieth century, when the Bayh-Dole Act and other statutory,
legal, and scientific developments led patents to move to the core of
academic science. Part III considers the contemporary period in
which patents have significantly permeated the culture of university
science. It explores the less appreciated ways in which patent doctrine
has internalized academic science and rejected academic
exceptionalism based in part on increasingly commercial norms on
the part of universities. Part IV examines the culmination of
academia’s internalization within the patent system in legislative
11
patent reform, most notably the America Invents Act. It also
describes how academic exceptionalism, which courts have rejected in
doctrine, has been resurrected in statute. Part V turns from the
descriptive to the normative, proposing enhancements to the patent
system’s regulation of various aspects of academic research and
patenting.
I. THE TRADITIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: SEPARATION AND
EXCEPTIONALISM
The first phase of academic science’s interactions with patent law
was largely characterized by mutual exclusion. Although U.S.
universities have long served practical needs, academic norms often
discouraged patenting. Furthermore, when universities first entered
the patent system, they did so to advance uniquely noncommercial
values. In reciprocal fashion, courts viewed academic science as
falling outside of the scope of patentability and afforded universities a

9. See Rai, supra note 7, at 92 (“Basic scientific research norms share many similarities
with the norms of academic institutions generally.”).
10. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).
11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
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rather privileged normative status within the patent system, thus
reflecting academic exceptionalism.
A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: Noncommercial Norms
and Forbearance
1. The Applied Nature of U.S. Universities. At first glance,
universities’ historical segregation from the patent system appears
rather curious given the pragmatic orientation of U.S. academic
12
institutions. Early American colleges and universities assumed a
13
highly practical nature to help meet the needs of a young country. In
this spirit, Thomas Jefferson established the University of Virginia in
14
1825 to provide “an useful American education.” The decentralized
nature of American universities contributed to this orientation;
universities depended on local funding for revenue and thus had to be
15
responsive to local economic and educational needs. A major
development in orienting universities toward practical imperatives
was the establishment of land-grant colleges in the mid-nineteenth
16
century. Contrary to the largely “verbalistic” curricula of prior
12. See JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 26 (2005); Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith,
Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 253, 254 (1998) (“U.S. universities have long had a more practical orientation than
universities in the United Kingdom or Germany.”); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept
University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39, 45 (“Certainly, in comparison with their
European counterparts, U.S. universities have always displayed a pragmatic bent.”).
13. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 530–31, 534–35 (Gerald
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (noting the practical, applied nature of the American
scientific mind).
14. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 26.
15. Nathan Rosenberg & Richard R. Nelson, American Universities and Technical Advance
in Industry, 23 RES. POL’Y 323, 325 (1994).
16. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012); Jennifer L. Croissant & Laurel Smith-Doerr,
Organizational Contexts of Science: Boundaries and Relationships between University and
Industry, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES, 691, 692–93 (Edward J.
Hacket, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch & Judy Wajcman eds., 3d ed. 2007); Yong S. Lee,
‘Technology Transfer’ and the Research University: A Search for the Boundaries of UniversityIndustry Collaboration, 25 RES. POL’Y 843, 850 (1996) (“American higher education can be said
to have roots in the landgrant philosophy embodied in the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Hatch
Act of 1887, which emphasize service to industry and agriculture.”); Joshua E. Powers,
Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on Performance of University
Technology Transfer, 74 J. HIGHER EDUC. 26, 45 (2003) (“[T]he economic development role for
America’s research universities had historically centered on the land-grant institutions.”). Even
before the Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 301–305,
307–309), the federal government granted land for the creation of public universities. Vernon
Carstensen, A Century of the Land-Grant Colleges, 33 J. HIGHER EDUC. 30, 30 (1962).
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universities, these colleges focused on solving practical problems
19
and providing instruction in agriculture and the mechanical arts.
This trend was bolstered by the establishment of Agricultural
20
Experiment Stations under the direction of land-grant colleges.
Although these experiment stations conducted basic research, they
were “‘in the business’ of developing findings and techniques that
were ready for use by farmers” and had a clearly pragmatic
21
character.
Notably, these Agricultural Experiment Stations
facilitated a public seed distribution system that disseminated the
22
fruits of research free to the public.
Consistent with their practical orientation, many early U.S.
23
universities cultivated close connections with industry. From 1890 to
1900, several universities established partnerships with commercial
24
entities in the Northeast industrial corridor. In an era of scarce
public funds for research, universities relied substantially on private
25
money for support. Universities played a key role in the
26
development of new engineering and applied sciences disciplines as
27
well as in the development of research-based pharmaceutical firms.
Rather than focusing exclusively on fundamental scientific principles,
17. Carstensen, supra note 16, at 35–36.
18. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 29; Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology
Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations,
19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 333–34 (2008).
19. Morrill Act of 1862 § 4, 12 Stat. at 504; see Carstensen, supra note 16, at 31. Congress
passed a second Morrill Act in 1890 that extended the land-grant college program to former
Confederate states. Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
321–326, 326a, 328).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 361a; see Carstensen, supra note 16, at 34–35.
21. Jeannette Colyvas, Michael Crow, Annetine Gelijns, Roberto Mazzoleni, Richard R.
Nelson, Nathan Rosenberg & Bhaven N. Sampat, How Do University Inventions Get into
Practice?, 48 MGMT. SCI. 61, 65 (2002); see Arthur D. Little, Industrial Research in America, 38
SCIENCE 643, 649–50 (1913) (discussing examples of the experiment stations’ work and its
practical character).
22. KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS 15 (2008).
23. Croissant & Smith-Doerr, supra note 16, at 691; Henry Etzkowitz, Entrepreneurial
Science in the Academy: A Case of the Transformation of Norms, 36 SOC. PROBS. 14, 15 (1989).
24. GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 18 (1990). Some
commentators around this time period, however, questioned the ability of universities to work
with industry. See C.E. Kenneth Mess, The Organization of Industrial Scientific Research, 42
SCIENCE 763, 766 (1916).
25. WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 34.
26. Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 327.
27. Jeffrey L. Furman & Megan J. MacGarvie, Academic Science and the Birth of Industrial
Research Laboratories in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 756,
774 (2007).

LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

10

9/18/2013 4:47 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1

much university research throughout the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries addressed practical problems in agriculture,
28
public health, and industry. Particularly in the life sciences,
relationships between universities and industry flourished between
29
World War I and World War II. By 1940, 50 U.S. companies were
30
supporting 270 biomedical research projects at 70 universities.
2. Antipatenting Norms. Given the pragmatic orientation of U.S.
universities, these institutions’ historical aversion to patenting might
seem somewhat odd. However, scientific norms prioritizing
communal sharing over individual property rights contributed to deep
31
skepticism of patents. As sociologist Robert Merton documented in
the early twentieth century, academic science relies heavily on the
sharing of information, theories, and research materials for collective
32
progress. Scientific knowledge thus constitutes “a common heritage
33
in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited.”
Drawing on his empirical work, Merton argued that science combines
28. Little, supra note 21, at 652; David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD
Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 124 (2005). Of course, such commercial forays were
not without their critics. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A
MEMORANDUM ON THE CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN 30 (1918); Dean Barus,
Quotations: Research and Teaching, 57 SCIENCE 445, 446 (1923); Charles Baskerville, University
and Industry, 30 SCIENCE 919, 920 (1916); H.A. Rowland, A Plea for Pure Science, 29 SCIENCE
242, 243 (1883). By the 1920s, however, opinion had solidified among many academic scientists
that universities could legitimately serve industrial interests. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 139 (2003).
29. David Blumenthal, Academic-Industrial Relationships in the Life Sciences, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2452, 2452 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as
Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 381 (2009); see Bhaven N.
Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After
Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 776 (2006) (“[I]t is likely that strong norms militating against
academic patenting checked any ambitions universities may have had to patent in instances
where publication or open dissemination would suffice for ‘technology transfer.’”(citing David
C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates in the USA,
1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 781 (2001)).
32. Merton’s empirical observations resonated with theoretical models of scientific
progress. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1996)
(highlighting the importance of communal work in establishing and displacing scientific
paradigms); Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1
MINERVA 54 (1962) (describing an autonomous scientific community with a high degree of
internal communication).
33. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
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four normative pillars: universalism, communism, disinterestedness,
34
and organized skepticism. Patents particularly conflict with the
Mertonian norm of communism, the principle that “[t]he substantive
findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are
35
assigned to the community.” In a system in which scientists freely
disclose their discoveries and build upon each other’s claims,
individual property rights in scientific knowledge are whittled “down
36
to a bare minimum.” As Merton observed, “The communism of the
scientific ethos is incompatible with the definition of technology as
37
‘private property’ in a capitalistic economy.”
Of course, Merton’s classic account of the communal norms of
academic science has been subject to critique. Commentators argue
38
that Merton’s norms are more “prescriptive” than “descriptive” and
note that academic science has always exhibited secrecy, rivalry, and
39
noncommunitarian incentives. Indeed, generalizations are difficult in
this realm, for some institutions and scientists embraced patenting
even in the early twentieth century. Some observers have disputed
not the existence of academic sharing norms, but rather the perceived
incompatibility of these norms with patents. Ironically, some early
commentators cited the tenacity of communal norms as a safeguard
that weighed in favor of patenting university discoveries; because
scientists were so committed to disinterested inquiry, they argued, it
was unlikely that patents and profit motives would adulterate
40
research agendas.

34. Id. at 270–78; Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 14; see also Rai, supra note 7, at 89 (noting
that other sociologists of science, such as Bernard Barber and Warren Hagstrom, came to
similar conclusions).
35. MERTON, supra note 33, at 273.
36. Id.; see Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1047.
37. MERTON, supra note 33, at 275; see Margo Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary
Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 226–27 (2006) (describing
traditional norms of openly disclosing research results).
38. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 697 (2001); see
Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 328–29; see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1048 n.128.
39. See Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 328–29 (“[T]he modem science establishment has
long had the anti-Mertonian vices of secrecy, rivalry, and inducements outside of noble curiosity
and concern for social welfare.” (footnote omitted)); Merges, supra note 7, at 147 (“The many
limitations on truly public dissemination lead, in fact, to the conclusion that science is not so
much given freely to the public as shared under a largely implicit code of conduct among a more
or less well-identified circle of similarly situated scientists.”).
40. See C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 212 (1930).
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Although subject to some debate, there is little doubt that
academic norms of open disclosure and communal sharing informed
universities’ early resistance to patenting. In the early twentieth
century, many actors in academic science looked down upon
41
patenting. Jacques Loeb of the Rockefeller Foundation, for
example, warned that “if the institutions for pure science go into the
42
handling of patents I am afraid pure science will be doomed.” The
foundation even threatened to stop funding the research of UC
Berkeley’s Herbert Evans if he tried to benefit financially from his
43
research through patents. Following World War I, there was an
international movement, primarily based in Europe, to protect
44
“scientific property” with exclusive rights. Tellingly, however, this
movement never gained much traction in the United States, and
several committees of the National Research Council rejected the
feasibility and desirability of establishing rights to scientific
45
property.
Based in part on these traditional scientific norms, university
scientists in the early twentieth century rarely patented their
46
discoveries. Instances of patenting occasionally arose, however, and
the first wave of meaningful university patenting occurred after

41. See, e.g., Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 396 (describing the debate over patent policy at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1930s); Daniel J. Kevles, Principles,
Property Rights, and Profits: Historical Reflections on University/Industry Tensions, 8
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 293, 295 (2001) (“Many [professors] had long contended, likely with
the support of their administrators, that university science should be unadulterated by
commercial considerations.”); Rai, supra note 7, at 88 (noting that communal norms largely
governed the scientific community prior to 1980).
42. Charles Weiner, Universities, Professors, and Patents: A Continuing Controversy, TECH.
REV., Feb.–Mar. 1986, at 33, 35; see also MATKIN, supra note 24, at 56.
43. BOK, supra note 28, at 139.
44. See, e.g., HAMSON, supra note 40, at 6; STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 844–72 (1930); Stephen B. Ladas, The Efforts for
International Protection of Scientific Property, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 552–53 (1929); John H.
Wigmore & Francesco Ruffini, Scientific Property, 22 ILL. L. REV. 355, 355 (1927).
45. Letter from Albert L. Barrows, Assistant Sec’y, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., to Dr. William
Allen Pusey (Nov. 5, 1931) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Letter from Vernon Kellogg,
Permanent Sec’y, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., to J. David Thompson, Sec’y, Am. Comm. on Int’l
Intellectual Cooperation, Nat’l Research Council (May 2, 1928) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
46. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 781; Charles Weiner, Patenting in Academic
Research: Historical Case Studies, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 50, 50 (1987); see Elizabeth
Popp Berman, Why Did Universities Start Patenting? Institution-Building and the Road to the
Bayh-Dole Act, 38 SOC. STUD. SCI. 835, 841 (2008) (noting that “university patenting was clearly
not institutionalized by the late 1960s”).
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World War I. In the early twentieth century, scientific norms against
exclusive rights in academic discoveries merged with institutional
norms of serving the public interest to define a uniquely
noncommercial approach to university patenting.
3. University Patenting Policies. Early patent policies on the part
of universities reveal a unique academic skepticism of patents. To
begin, many universities had no official patent policy prior to World
48
War II, thus illustrating the peripheral status of intellectual property
within academia. Even though the University of California required
employees to report patentable inventions to the university starting in
49
50
1926, it did not adopt a formal patent policy until 1943. Even more
revealing, early patent policies heavily emphasized using patents to
serve the public interest. Although a 1925 policy from Columbia
University noted the university’s objective of financially benefitting
from patents, it also stressed the importance of monitoring the quality
of manufactured articles and ensuring that the public could obtain
51
them at reasonable prices. The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s (MIT) first patent-ownership policy from 1932 was
typical in stating that the university “shall hold and administer these
52
rights for the ultimate benefit of the public.”
Universities were particularly reluctant to use patents to restrict
access to health-related technologies. Harvard University decided in
the 1920s to refuse to profit from faculty research in public health and
53
therapeutics. Its 1934 patent policy stated, “No patents primarily
concerned with therapeutics or public health may be taken out by any
member of the University, except with the consent of the President
47. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 783.
48. Id. at 789.
49. David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 102 (2001).
50. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 62.
51. The Administration of Patents by Columbia University, 61 SCIENCE 382, 383 (1925); see
also Archie M. Palmer, Medical Patents, 137 JAMA 497, 498 (1948) (“Patenting [medical]
discoveries is not considered to be wrong in itself, but to be desirable in order to control them in
the public interest.”).
52. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 62. This policy also cautioned against unduly encouraging
faculty members to engage in invention at the expense of other academic duties. Henry
Etzkowitz, Knowledge as Property: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Debate
over Academic Patent Policy, 32 MINERVA 383, 399 (1994).
53. Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in
Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 92 ISIS 541, 547 (2001).
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and Fellows; nor will such patents be taken out by the University
54
itself except for dedication to the public.” Similarly, Yale
University’s 1934 policy stated that “it is, in general, undesirable and
contrary to the best interests of medicine and the public to patent any
discovery or invention applicable in the fields of public health or
55
medicine.” An influential 1948 survey of patent policies confirmed
56
similar policies at leading universities. According to the survey,
many scientists felt that “the results of their research, both patentable
57
and otherwise, should be shared ‘without fee or stipulation.’” At
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, and Chicago, policies against
58
patenting biomedical discoveries lasted until the 1970s.
4. University Patenting Practices. Case studies of university
patenting in the early twentieth century reveal deep anxiety over
blending academia and commerce as well as a commitment to
utilizing patents to serve the public interest. In 1907, Frederick
Cottrell at UC Berkeley invented the electrostatic precipitator, a
filtration device that removes harmful particles from flowing gases. In
59
a rather novel move, he patented his discovery. He did not, however,
assign his patent to UC Berkeley, for Cottrell was wary of the impact
60
of patenting and licensing on scientific culture. For its part, the
university was concerned that its charter did not permit involvement
61
in commercial ventures. In 1912, motivated largely by a desire to
separate the university from commercial concerns, Cottrell
established an independent firm called Research Corporation to

54. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 69. Over the next forty years, “Harvard took out perhaps a
half-dozen patents, dedicating all of them to the public.” Kevles, supra note 41, at 296.
55. Palmer, supra note 51, at 500. The policy, however, did allow patenting on a case-bycase basis when necessary to protect the public interest as long as profits would not accrue to
the scientist or the university. Id.
56. Id. at 498.
57. Id.
58. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 791. At Harvard, this policy was only altered
when the university entered into a sponsored research agreement with Monsanto, which
received the right to secure exclusive licenses for all inventions arising from such research. See
MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 58–60 (1986)
(describing the agreement between Harvard Medical School and Monsanto). In 1975, Harvard
adopted a new patent policy that “implicitly abandoned its commitment to dedicate patents in
medical therapeutics and public health to the public.” Kevles, supra note 41, at 299.
59. U.S. Patent No. 895,729 (filed July 9, 1907).
60. Sampat, supra note 31, at 774.
61. Weiner, supra note 46, at 51.
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manage his patents. Consistent with its academic origins, Research
Corporation channeled whatever licensing revenues it generated back
into funding scientific research.
Academic, noncommercial norms also surrounded T. Brailsford
Robertson’s patenting of tethelin. A decade after Cottrell, Robertson,
also of UC Berkeley, discovered tethelin, a substance that promotes
63
human tissue growth. He patented his invention and assigned his
rights to the university, thus producing what may have been the first
64
patents owned by the University of California. The Board of
Regents of the University of California was initially reluctant to take
the patents because of the perceived impropriety of a public
65
university contracting with private firms. Indeed, this arrangement
was so novel that Science magazine declared that it “should be
66
subjected to careful scrutiny and the fullest possible criticism.”
Ultimately, the Regents established an independent patentmanagement corporation, naming themselves as trustees, rather than
67
taking title in the university itself. Throughout, Robertson and the
university stressed their intention to use the patents to serve the
68
public interest. Among other objectives, patenting would ensure that
the University of California could monitor the quality of tethelin69
based therapies, thus safeguarding patient health. Notwithstanding
these lofty goals, Robertson’s plan elicited significant criticism from
70
an academic community deeply suspicious of patents. Johns Hopkins
University later rejected Robertson as a candidate for a chair in
71
physiology in part because he had patented tethelin.
62. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 59–60; see F.G. Cottrell, Patent Experience of the Research
Corporation, 28 TRANSACTIONS AM. INST. CHEM. ENGINEERS 222, 222–23 (1932).
63. U.S. Patent No. 1,218,472 (filed Oct. 8, 1915). Robertson also obtained British patent
rights. U.K. Patent No. GB15683 (filed Nov. 6, 1915).
64. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 59.
65. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52.
66. T. Brailsford Robertson, The Utilization of Patents for the Promotion of Research, 46
SCIENCE 371, 372 (1917).
67. See Rima D. Apple, Patenting University Research: Harry Steenbock and the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, 80 ISIS 375, 382 (1989).
68. See Robertson, supra note 66, at 371; Charles Weiner, Science in the Marketplace:
Historical Precedents and Problems, in FROM GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION TO
BIOTECHNOLOGY—THE CRITICAL TRANSITION 123, 125 (William J. Whelan & Sandra Black
eds. 1982).
69. See Robertson, supra note 66, at 376.
70. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52.
71. BOK, supra note 28, at 139. Of course, not all academics opposed patenting. See, e.g.,
B.S. Hedrick, On Patent Laws as a Means for the Advancement of Science, 1 SCIENCE 166
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The patenting of an antitoxin for scarlet fever also aroused
considerable controversy. During World War I, researchers George
and Gladys Dick of the University of Chicago developed an antitoxin
72
for the bacterial toxin that causes scarlet fever. Concerned that lowquality imitations of their product could jeopardize patient health, the
73
Dicks decided to patent their discovery. After the American Medical
Association declined to take the patents, the Dicks created an
74
independent, nonprofit Scarlet Fever Committee to manage them.
Nonetheless, the Dicks received intense criticism from the medical
community. In the 1920s, numerous editorials and articles criticized
75
their decision to patent a substance with great therapeutic value.
The patenting of insulin further reflects academic skepticism of
patents and the altruistic manner in which universities tried to use
them. In 1923, researchers at the University of Toronto patented a
76
method of making insulin and assigned it to the university. The
decision to patent insulin was highly controversial and clashed with
traditional norms discouraging the privatization of research
77
discoveries. In making this decision, the researchers were influenced
by the University of Minnesota’s patenting of thyroxin, which allowed
the university to safeguard the commercial manufacture of related
78
therapeutics. Following this model, the University of Toronto
established an “insulin committee” in 1922 to manage the patent even
(1880). Land-grant universities, which have a particularly applied orientation, were more open
to patenting. Furthermore, patents in engineering aroused less suspicion than those in health
and medicine.
72. Weiner, supra note 46, at 52.
73. Id. at 53.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see, e.g., George F. Dick & Gladys Henry Dick, Correspondence, The Patents in
Scarlet Fever Toxin and Antitoxin, 88 JAMA 1341, 1341–42 (1927); Ethics and Patents, 16 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 919 (1926).
76. U.S. Patent No. 1,469,994 (filed Jan. 12, 1923).
77. Maurice Cassier & Christiane Sinding, ‘Patenting in the Public Interest:’ Administration
of Insulin Patents by the University of Toronto, 24 HIST. & TECH. 153, 154 (2008); see Etzkowitz,
supra note 52, at 383–84 (indicating that “large profits, public health and the reputation of the
university were at stake” and that problems regarding the “creation of the private ownership of
knowledge” needed resolution).
78. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 154–55. The inventors who patented thyroxin sold
their rights to the University of Minnesota on the condition that the university manage the
commercialization of the patent to serve the interests of the medical profession. Id. Accordingly,
the university established a committee to manage the patent and “retained . . . strict control
over the preparation, sale, and price of thyroxin” once it was licensed. Id. at 155. At the
University of Toronto, the researchers declined to take any revenues from the insulin patent
and assigned their rights to the university for one dollar each. Kevles, supra note 41, at 296.
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before it was granted. The university was wary of monopolies on
manufacturing insulin, so after granting Eli Lilly a one-year exclusive
80
license for experimental development, the university nonexclusively
81
and widely licensed the patent. In so doing, the university used the
patent as “a tool to discipline the industrial world, to organize the
distribution and use of the new drug, and to guarantee its
82
accessibility.” Indeed, the university exploited its normative leverage
as a public, academic institution in negotiations with commercial
83
licensees. Ultimately, this “democratization of industrial property”
84
facilitated the wide availability of manufactured insulin.
The University of Wisconsin’s patenting practices reveal both the
public-minded nature of academic patenting as well as the high
standard of conduct expected of academic entities. In the 1920s,
university researcher Harry Steenbock invented a process for
irradiating food with ultraviolet light, thus enhancing its vitamin D
85
content. Steenbock’s process represented a promising treatment for
rickets, a disease caused by vitamin D deficiency that particularly
86
87
afflicted poor populations. Quite controversially, Steenbock
88
obtained four patents related to irradiation technology. Steenbock’s
motivations for patenting ranged from the altruistic to the parochial.
On the one hand, he was influenced by the University of Toronto’s
experience with insulin to utilize patents to ensure the “safest, most
89
healthful dissemination” of irradiated foods. Additionally, he sought

79. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 155; Kevles, supra note 41, at 293–94.
80. Blumenthal, supra note 29, at 2452.
81. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 60; Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 155.
82. Cassier & Sinding, supra note 77, at 156.
83. Id. at 166.
84. Id. at 160.
85. Weiner, supra note 46, at 55–57.
86. Id. at 55.
87. See Apple, supra note 67, at 378–79; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788; Weiner,
supra note 46, at 56.
88. U.S. Patent No. 2,057,399 (filed May 14, 1932); U.S. Patent No. 1,871,136 (filed Dec. 27,
1926); U.S. Patent No. 1,871,135 (filed Dec. 27, 1926); U.S. Patent No. 1,680,818 (filed June 30,
1924).
89. Apple, supra note 67, at 377; see Harry Steenbock & A. Black, Fat-Soluble Vitamins:
The Induction of Growth-Promoting and Calcifying Properties in a Ration by Exposure to UltraViolet Light, 61 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 405, 405 (1924) (“[T]o protect the interest of the
public in the possible commercial use of these findings, applications for Letters Patent, both as
to processes and products, have been filed with the United States Patent Office . . . .”); Harry
Steenbock, The Induction of Growth Promoting and Calcifying Properties in a Ration by
Exposure to Light, 60 SCIENCE 224, 225 (1924) (stating the same).
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to preempt “patent pirates” who would patent inventions related to
90
his discovery and then charge exorbitant fees for their application.
Furthermore, he aimed to generate licensing royalties to fund further
91
research. On the other hand, Steenbock also sought to use patents to
protect the local dairy industry in Wisconsin by keeping irradiation
technology away from manufacturers of oleomargarine, the “butter of
92
the poor.” Although some of his motivations were self-interested,
Steenbock felt that as a scientist, he should distance himself and the
93
university from the commercial, profit-making aspects of patenting.
94
For this and other reasons, Steenbock helped create the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), an independent entity that
95
manages the university’s patents. Tellingly, Steenbock initially
96
refused to accept any share of royalties. In its rather sharp business
practices, WARF was the exception that proved the rule regarding
the norms of academic patenting. WARF received significant
criticism for its hard-nosed business arrangements and threats of
97
patent enforcement, which were all the more controversial given
that they diverged from traditional academic patent practices.
5. The Institutional Structure of University Patenting and
Licensing. Universities’ unease with patenting further manifested
itself in the institutional separation of academic and patenting
functions. The perceived impropriety of mixing academia and
commerce, as well as the difficulty of managing patents, discouraged

90. Apple, supra note 67, at 377. Patent “piracy” was a commonly perceived problem in the
early years of university patenting. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 784.
91. Apple, supra note 67, at 377.
92. Id. at 377–78.
93. Id. at 380; see RIMA APPLE, VITAMANIA: VITAMINS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42
(1996).
94. In addition, Steenbock had had some rather frustrating experiences with university
administration in the past. Apple, supra note 67, at 381–83.
95. Weiner, supra note 68, at 127–28.
96. Apple, supra note 67, at 388. Steenbock later relented, partly at the urging of WARF,
which argued that other inventors would not assign their patents to WARF without such
inducement. Id.
97. See Etzkowitz, supra note 52, at 389; see also Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788;
H.A. Toulmin, Jr., Commercial Research by Universities Threatens Science and Education,
PRODUCT ENGINEERING, June 1947, at 81, 82–82 (criticizing WARF for exploiting publicly
sponsored technology while not granting licenses for products outside of the dairy industry);
Weiner, supra note 46, at 56–57 (describing a 1943 U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing during
which WARF was accused of abusing its patent rights); Monopoly On Vitamin D Charged,
Official Denounces Research Foundation, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 21, 1943, at 5.
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universities from directly handling patenting and licensing.
Accordingly, early forays into the patent system were marked by
functional segregation. As noted, Cottrell created Research
Corporation largely to insulate the University of California from the
99
commercial aspects of patenting. In 1937, MIT signed an invention
administration agreement with Research Corporation for similar
100
101
reasons, and dozens of other universities followed suit. As
described above, the University of California did not take title to
Robertson’s tethelin patent directly but created an independent
102
corporation to manage it. Finally, the WARF model proved very
influential; by 1956 there were more than fifty similar, separately
103
incorporated organizations handling university patents. As these
examples demonstrate, anxiety over integrating universities into the
patent system manifested itself even in the institutional structure of
academic patenting.
***
In norms, policy, and practice, universities and university
scientists sought to distance themselves from the commercial aspects
of patents while utilizing exclusive rights to serve the public good.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, universities shied away
from direct involvement in patenting and licensing “because of fears
that such involvement might compromise, or might be seen as
compromising, their commitments to open science and their
104
institutional missions to advance and disseminate knowledge.”
University entities were reluctant to patent scientific discoveries,
particularly in the realm of health and medicine. Jonas Salk, the
University of Pittsburgh researcher who developed the polio vaccine,
famously declined to patent his discovery, noting, “Who owns my

98. Berman, supra note 46, at 842; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 782, 787; Palmer,
supra note 51, at 508. Cottrell warned that any institution dealing with licensees “cannot avoid
being eventually drawn into every phase of the problem” of technological development.
Cottrell, supra note 62, at 225.
99. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 791.
100. Etzkowitz, supra note 52, at 403–04; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 788; Sampat,
supra note 31, at 774–75.
101. Sampat, supra note 31, at 775.
102. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
103. Apple, supra note 67, at 390.
104. Sampat, supra note 31, at 774.
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polio vaccine? The people! Could you patent the sun?” When
universities did patent discoveries, they did so not simply to maximize
revenues, but to ensure product safety, prevent patent piracy, and
106
disseminate technologies widely to the public.
Furthermore,
institutional segregation helped buffer scientists and universities from
the business of patents.
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Separation and
Exceptionalism
While universities distanced themselves from patent law, patent
doctrine also distanced itself from academic science. In several ways,
patent courts created doctrinal hedges that tended to separate the
107
fruits of academic science from the domain of exclusive rights. In
some contexts, patent doctrine further engaged in academic
exceptionalism by treating university entities differently than other
actors in the patent system. Such separation and exceptionalism arose
from multiple factors, including a prudential desire to keep
“upstream” discoveries in the public domain and to not burden
nonprofit research with patents. Notably, they arose in part from
courts’ perception of the noncommercial character of university
science. The communal, public-spirited norms of academic research
and technological development helped inform a rhetorical vision of
universities that helped justify—or at least rationalize—a hands-off
approach to academic science. A stable equilibrium thus emerged
between noncommercial patenting practices by university entities and
academic exceptionalism in patent doctrine.
1. Patentable Subject Matter. The doctrinal separation of
academic science from patent law is best illustrated in the law of

105. Sara Boettiger & Brian D. Wright, Open Source in Biotechnology: Open Questions,
INNOVATIONS, Fall 2006, at 45, 48; see also Josephine Johnston & Angela A. Wasunna, Patents,
Biomedical Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing Solutions, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2007, at S2, S2. A significant funder of Salk’s research, the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (now the March of Dimes), did not allow patents or the
receipt of royalties for funded inventions. Seth Shulman, Cashing in on Medical Knowledge,
MIT TECH. REV. Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 38, 42.
106. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 784–85.
107. Cf. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 462 (2004) (arguing that a traditional
distinction between basic and applied science was “essentially hardwired into law”).
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patentable subject matter. Drawing on English antecedents, U.S.
doctrine has long prohibited patenting abstract principles and natural
properties, thus excluding raw scientific discoveries from
110
patentability. In 1852, the Supreme Court observed:
It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power,
should one be discovered in addition to those already
known. . . . The same may be said of electricity, and of any other
power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be applied to
111
useful purposes by the use of machinery.

The next year, Justice Grier, dissenting in the famous case of O’Reilly
112
v. Morse, stated:
The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of
nature, without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the
subject of a patent. But he who takes this new element or power, as
yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the
servant of man . . . is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders
113
its protection.

Lower courts reiterated this distinction between the “laboratory of
the philosopher” and the domain of patentable technologies. In 1862,
the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York stated that
patentable subject matter arises “beyond the mere domain of
discovery,” when an inventor has directed some principle, force, or

108. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter as “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof”). The statutory definition of patentable subject matter has remained largely unchanged
over the history of the U.S. patent system.
109. Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 ENG. REP. 651, 667 (Ct. Com. Pl.) (opinion of Lord Eyre,
C.J.) (“Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle.”); see Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63 (2011).
110. Peter Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law
Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine To Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 92–98 (2005). The exclusion of abstract ideas and natural products from
patentable subject matter tends to “force[] patents downstream, away from unfinished research
and toward completed products or processes more suitable for the market.” DAN L. BURK &
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 124 (2009).
111. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1853).
112. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
113. Id. at 132–33 (Grier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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law to act on “the material world.” Similarly, in 1895, the Ninth
Circuit held that employing a scientific discovery in the same fashion
115
as it is applied in nature is not patentable. Notably, the court
invoked this distinction to invalidate three of WARF’s irradiation
patents in 1943, observing that the patent statute aimed to reward the
116
“inventor,” not the “pure scientist.”
The segregation of academic discoveries from the patent system
was further corroborated by cases holding that natural phenomena
117
are not eligible for patenting. As the Supreme Court stated in 1948,
“He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of
118
the law of nature to a new and useful end.” Thus the passive
observation of nature, a primary function of academic science, does
not yield patentable subject matter.
Courts’ traditional exclusion of natural laws, natural phenomena,
and abstract principles from patentability arose from several
rationales, at least some of which resonate with the traditional
119
Mertonian norms discussed above. For example, patentable subject
matter doctrine reflected a communalistic theory of technological
progress in which scientists and inventors could draw from a shared
pool of upstream basic knowledge to further their research and
120
develop downstream technologies. As economist Richard Nelson
observes, “For this reason scientists have long argued for free and
wide communication of research results, and for this reason natural
121
‘laws’ and facts are not patentable.” This sentiment is reflected in
114. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865)
(emphasis added).
115. Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1895) (citing 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 186 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co., 1890)).
116. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293,
295 (9th Cir. 1943).
117. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Ex
Parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 125 (1889); see also Hector M. Holmes, Book
Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1428, 1432 (1932) (reviewing C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES (1930)).
118. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see Sarnoff, supra
note 109, at 89.
119. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
120. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 63–68
(2008).
121. Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL.
ECON. 297, 302 (1959).
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patent decisions likening natural phenomena and abstract principles
to “basic tools of scientific and technological work” that must remain
122
in the public domain.
Additionally, courts also justified excluding academic findings
from patentability based on the noncommercial nature of academic
research. As the Second Circuit observed in 1944,
Epoch-making “discoveries” of “mere” general scientific “laws,”
without more, cannot be patented. So the great “discoveries” of
Newton or Faraday could not have been rewarded with such a grant
of monopoly. Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like
Faraday care little for monetary rewards; generally the motives of
such outstanding geniuses are not pecuniary. Perhaps (although no
one really knows) the same cannot be said of those lesser geniuses
123
who put such discoveries to practical uses.

In this regard, the Second Circuit invoked the Mertonian image of the
124
financially disinterested scientist. This image had some empirical
support. The opinion cites scholarship by economist Paul Howard
Douglas noting that prominent scientists such as Michael Faraday,
James Maxwell, Charles Darwin, Louis Pasteur, and Louis Agassiz
125
were not motivated by profits in their scientific research. Rather,
intellectual passion and a genuine excitement for discovery trumped
126
other motivations. The rhetorical trope of the noble, financially
disinterested scientist thus provided another rationale for excluding
natural laws and other academic discoveries from patentable subject
127
matter.
2. Utility. Moving beyond patentable subject matter, the doctrine
of utility also tended to drive a wedge between academic science and

122. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92
(1978).
123. Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (footnotes omitted).
124. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
125. Paul H. Douglas, The Reality of Non-Commercial Incentives in Economic Life, in THE
TREND OF ECONOMICS 153, 156–62 (1924).
126. Notably, nonfinancial incentives were important not only for traditional “men of
science” but also for “‘practical’ scientists” working in industry. Id. at 173–74.
127. This perception that scientists are not motivated by profit continued to hold much
sway. See Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“Yet patent law has never been the domain of the abstract—one cannot patent the very
discoveries which make the greatest contributions to human knowledge, such as Einstein’s
discovery of the photoelectric effect, nor has it ever been considered that the lure of commercial
award provided by a patent was needed to encourage such contributions.”).
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128

While utility is a relatively low bar to
the patent system.
129
patentability, it has particular traction in the context of academic
130
science. In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court ruled in 1966
that a process for producing chemical compounds of no known utility
131
failed the substantial utility requirement of patentability. The case
does not deal with an academic invention per se. Notably, however,
the process failed the utility requirement even though the chemicals it
produced were under academic investigation for potential anticancer
132
properties. Evoking principles consistent with academic norms
against privatizing foundational discoveries, the Court cautioned,
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not
capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and
perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block
off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
133
benefit to the public.

Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Horni Signal
Manufacturing Corp., the Court further observed that “‘[a] patent
system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the
134
realm of philosophy.’” Lower courts followed Brenner’s teaching
that intermediates in the production of compounds of no known
135
utility lack utility themselves. Furthermore, courts extended this
rationale to the disclosure requirements of patentability, reasoning
that a patent application that does not disclose a utility also does not
136
enable any claimed invention. In a traditional mid-twentieth-century
paradigm in which university research generally focused on upstream

128. As Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have observed, limitations on patentable
subject matter worked “hand in hand” with utility doctrine to exclude upstream research tools
from patents. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 124.
129. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (5th ed. 2011) (“The vast majority of patent applications
are processed without the PTO raising any question as to utility, and the utility doctrine is also
rarely litigated as a defense in infringement actions.”).
130. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)
131. Id. at 535–36.
132. Id. at 532.
133. Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 536 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A 1965)) (citing Katz v.
Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1944)).
135. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 939 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
136. See supra note 135.
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discoveries, the utility doctrine tended to restrict the patentability of
academic inventions.
3. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception. Patent law
erected boundaries between itself and academic science not only in
doctrines governing patentability, but also in the law of infringement.
The clearest example of such exceptionalism is the common law
experimental use exception, which exempts from liability the
137
unlicensed use of patented technology for noncommercial purposes.
Justice Story laid the foundation for this doctrine in the 1813 case of
138
Whittemore v. Cutter, in which he stated, “[I]t could never have
been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed
such a[n infringing] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
139
produce its described effects.” Elsewhere, Justice Story equated
infringing use of an invention with “the making with an intent to use
for profit,” in contradistinction with use for mere “philosophical
experiment” or to confirm details contained in the patent
140
specification. This conception of experimental use proved highly
141
influential; one well-regarded 1890 treatise states that “no act [is] an
infringement unless it affects the pecuniary interests of the owner of
142
the patented invention.” Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century,
“the issue of whether experimentation amounted to patent
143
infringement seemed to have been clearly resolved” in favor of
experimenters.

137. The experimental use exception has attracted significant scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 7; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018
(2003); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Elizabeth A.
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special
Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81. The experimental use exception
has rarely been a successful defense in patent litigation. See, e.g., Rowe, supra, at 926 n.18
(finding only four cases in which accused infringers successfully claimed experimental use as a
defense).
138. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
139. Id. at 1121; see Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 458; Strandburg, supra note 137, at 84.
140. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); see also
Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
141. Mueller, supra note 137, at 20.
142. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 898; see Mueller, supra note 137, at 20–21.
143. Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 457–58.
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The vast majority of cases involving the experimental use
exception do not involve academic experimentation with patented
144
inventions per se. However, one early case suggested that use of a
patented invention for academic research qualified for the safe
145
harbor. In Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing, the Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Company was found to have infringed a patent related
146
to mining technology. In conducting an accounting, however, the
district court excluded sales of materials to the Colorado School of
Mines that could be used to make an infringing device. The court
concluded that some of these parts “were for use in laboratory
machines used for experimental purposes, and consequently did not
147
contribute to an infringing use.” The court went on to note that
“[t]he making or using of a patented invention merely for
experimental purposes, without any intent to derive profits or
148
practical advantage therefrom, is not infringement.” Although this
is a singular case, it suggests a privileged status for university research
based on its noncommercial nature. Whether or not this approach
was correct as a doctrinal matter, for several decades, many university
scientists believed that the experimental use exception immunized
149
nonprofit-university research from infringement. Indeed, “most
academic institutions freely infringed patents” until the Federal
150
Circuit revisited this issue again in the early twenty-first century.
4. Remedies. Though more speculative, there is one prominent
case involving a court extending rather exceptional treatment to a
university patentee in the context of remedies. In Vitamin
151
Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,
144. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Dugan v.
Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18
F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va. 1937); Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 390, 392–
93 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
145. Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935).
146. Id. at 699; see Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Bayh-Dole Under Siege: The Challenge to Federal
Patent Policy as a Result of Madey v. Duke University, 30 J.C. & U.L. 619, 627 (2004); see
Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1018.
147. Ruth, 13 F. Supp. at 703.
148. Id. at 713.
149. Ed Ergenzinger & Murray Spruill, Basic Science in U.S. Universities Can Infringe
Patents, SCIENTIST, Mar. 10, 2003, at 43, 43; Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 633 (1985).
150. Rowe, supra note 137, at 928.
151. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1944).
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WARF sued Vitamin Technologists for infringing the irradiation
patents of University of Wisconsin researcher (and WARF co152
The Ninth Circuit ruled for the
founder) Harry Steenbock.
153
defendants, invalidating all or portions of Steenbock’s three patents.
In doing so, however, the court also made several influential
statements on the inappropriateness of injunctive relief in that case.
The subtext of the case was that WARF sought to enjoin Vitamin
Technologists’ irradiation of oleomargarine to protect Wisconsin’s
dairy interests. Such enforcement would have disproportionately
harmed poor communities, which favored the less expensive
154
oleomargarine over butter itself. Considering all these factors, the
court noted that injunctive relief would have been inappropriate:
The evidence and appellee’s briefs are replete with well verified
statements of the great boon to humanity of Dr. Steenbock’s
scientific discoveries for the prevention and cure of rickets. The
truth of such statements make the stronger the contention that it is a
public offense to withhold such processes from any of the principal
foods of the rachitic poor, or, indeed, from those of any such
155
sufferers.

This dictum suggested that WARF’s patents should not constrain
access to an important discovery with great potential to enhance
social welfare. This rationale was at odds with prevailing Supreme
Court doctrine at the time, which held that patentees had no
156
obligation to use (or license) their patents. Though a singular
instance—and one should not infer too much—this case represents a
prominent example of a court eschewing strict enforcement of a
university patent to serve the public interest.
***
In sum, there appears to be some reciprocity between norms and
doctrine in the early history of university patenting. Scientific norms
discouraged patenting, and universities sought to avoid the taint of
commercialism in their early patent practices. In reciprocal fashion, in
a variety of doctrinal areas, patent courts historically excluded the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 941.
Id. at 941, 949, 951–52.
Id. at 943–44.
Id. at 945.
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
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fruits of academic science from patentability or treated academic
entities differently from commercial actors. Notably, these doctrinal
hedges significantly paralleled the traditional academic and publicinterest norms that governed university science. The outputs of basic
research did not comprise patentable subject matter partly because
retaining these resources in the public domain would best promote
technological progress. Furthermore, patents and associated profit
motives were not necessary to motivate academics to generate such
discoveries, thus weighing against extending patent protection to such
discoveries. Additionally, courts were reluctant to extend
infringement liability to academic research, which was
noncommercial in nature. Ultimately, an integrated system emerged
where prevailing academic norms and patent doctrine achieved a
rough equilibrium. As we will see, this mutually segregating
equilibrium based on noncommercial norms and academic
exceptionalism would not last, and a very different one would take its
place.
II. TRANSITION: PATENTS ENTER THE ACADEMY
This equilibrium began to shift as academic institutions started to
vastly increase their patenting activity. Though most observers situate
157
the rise of university patenting at the end of the twentieth century,
antecedents earlier in that century contributed to this development.
To generate large numbers of patentable inventions, universities
needed more significant sources of research funding than the private
trusts and donations upon which they had historically relied. To this
end, massive increases in federal science funding during World War II
158
infused universities with money. Key technological advances—from
the mass production of penicillin to the Manhattan Project—helped
win the war and revealed to policymakers the importance of largescale science funding. Vannevar Bush, who served as chief science
advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, argued forcefully for

157. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1374 (1999)
(noting that the Bayh-Dole Act, which was passed in 1980, “set the stage for modern university
licensing”).
158. See MATKIN, supra note 24, at 20; WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 121; Rosenberg &
Nelson, supra note 15, at 334 (“World War II was a watershed in the history of American
science and technology and, in particular, led to a dramatic change in the roles played by
American universities in scientific and technical enterprises.”). Actually, federal research
funding had already increased sharply during World War I, which also saw the establishment of
the National Research Council. MATKIN, supra note 24, at 18.

LEE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

9/18/2013 4:47 PM

PATENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY

29

159

expansive science funding to continue after the war, particularly in
160
medicine and public health. Federal science funding increased
markedly in the first post-war decade and accelerated even faster in
161
the late 1950s.
Notably, increased funding of university science was not framed
in an imperative of immediate commercialization. Bush fully expected
federal funds to facilitate the development of medicines, labor-saving
162
devices, and other applied technologies. However, he rejected leftleaning calls for government to directly manage scientific research to
163
satisfy immediate social and economic needs.
Rather, he
championed undirected scientific work and “basic” research, which
164
promised significant, though unpredictable, long-term benefits.
Accordingly, the orientation of university research shifted after
World War II away from short-term problem solving toward
165
addressing more fundamental issues. Within this linear model of
technological advance, federal funding and university research
created an upstream “reservoir of knowledge” that would facilitate
166
downstream technological development.
This linear model of
scientific and technological progress paralleled philosopher of science
Michael Polanyi’s conception of an autonomous “republic of science”
that would receive public support but remain insulated from political,
167
social, and market influences. It also resonated with traditional
Mertonian norms of noncommercial academic research and
communal progress.
As the Cold War waned, however, federal policy shifted.
Policymakers began to deemphasize military superiority and focus

159. See VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS FRONTIER 11, 31 (1945).
160. STEPHEN P. STRICKLAND, POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND DREAD DISEASE: A SHORT
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MEDICAL RESEARCH POLICY 22 (1972); Blumenthal, supra note
29, at 2453.
161. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 793.
162. BUSH, supra note 159, at 10–11.
163. Id. at 18.
164. Id.; Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 335.
165. Lee, supra note 16, at 850.
166. Timothy L. Faley & Michael Sharer, Technology Transfer and Innovation: Reexamining
and Broadening the Perspective of the Transfer of Discoveries Resulting from GovernmentSponsored Research, COMP. TECH. TRANSFER & SOC’Y, Aug. 2005, at 109, 111 & fig.1. See
generally BUSH, supra note 159.
167. See Polanyi, supra note 32, at 54, 56; see also Kevles, supra note 41, at 297–98 (arguing
that the federal government’s massive funding of academic research lessened universities’ need
to partner with industry and served to shore up antipatenting norms).
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more on ensuring U.S. global economic competitiveness. They
began to question the linear theory of technological advance that
largely segregated upstream academic research from downstream
commercialization. A consensus emerged that knowledge flow
169
between academic science and industry is bidirectional and that
innovation was best served by collaborative relationships spanning
170
the “triple helix” of government, academia, and industry. As a
result, federal science policy began to focus more on downstream
171
research, technology transfer, and commercialization.
These policy shifts ultimately culminated in the Bayh-Dole Act
(“the Act”). While the conventional view holds that the Act fueled a
vast increase in university patenting, academic patenting was already
172
on the rise at the time of its enactment. Responding to criticisms
173
that government-owned patents were not being commercialized, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had
established a system of Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) in the
late 1960s. Under IPAs, universities with approved technology
transfer capabilities could retain title to patents on federally funded
174
inventions and grant exclusive licenses to firms. Indeed, policy shifts
175
that threatened IPAs helped motivate support for the Bayh-Dole
Act by universities that already enjoyed the benefits of patenting
176
federally funded inventions.
HEW’s policy changes fed into the broader debate over who
should take title to patents arising from government-funded

168. BOK, supra note 28, at 11.
169. Fiona Murray, Innovation as Co-Evolution of Scientific and Technological Networks:
Exploring Tissue Engineering, 31 RES. POL’Y 1389, 1391 (2002).
170. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 119–22, 132 (2001).
171. Id.
172. DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD NELSON, BHAVEN SAMPAT & ARVIDS ZIEDONIS,
IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 104 (2004).
Public universities, which focused more on applied research and had incentives to provide a
return on taxpayer investments, were more active in patenting than private institutions prior to
the Bayh-Dole Act. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28, at 119.
173. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1691 (1996).
174. Id. at 1691–92; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 795.
175. See Berman, supra note 46, at 854; Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1692; Mowery &
Sampat, supra note 31, at 795.
176. See Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 62; Sampat, supra note 31, at 780.
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177

research. For several decades, federal agencies pursued different
approaches: some took title to patents themselves while others
allowed grantees (such as universities) to take title to patents,
178
reserving only a license for themselves. In the late 1970s, concerns
grew that government-owned patents were stifling innovation, as
firms would not develop inventions into commercial products without
possessing exclusive rights. Empirical evidence corroborated these
179
concerns,
which were exacerbated by perceptions of lagging
180
economic competitiveness relative to Europe and Japan. Political
momentum began to grow in favor of reforming federal policy
governing the ownership of publicly funded inventions.
To spur the commercialization of these inventions, Congress
181
passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.
The Act allowed and
encouraged small businesses and nonprofits that received government
182
funds to take title to patents arising from federally funded research.
Congress enacted this legislation on the view that exclusive rights
were necessary to motivate additional private investment to develop
183
patented inventions into commercial products. This made intuitive
sense for small-business grantees that could themselves develop
177. See Memorandum of Aug. 23, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (1971); Memorandum of Oct.
10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1963); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1 INVESTIGATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT 2, 89–90 (1947).
178. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 173.
.
179 In the 1970s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had a
commercialization rate of less than 1 percent for inventions under its free-use policy but 18 to 20
percent for inventions for which contractors controlled patents. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry
Avorn, University-Based Science and Biotechnology Products: Defining the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property, 293 JAMA 850, 851 (2005). The statistical case in favor of the Bayh-Dole
Act is suspect, however, in light of significant selection bias. Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1702–
05.
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt.1, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6460–61; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1006, pt. 1, at 17 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 1 (1979).
181. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).
182. In 1984, President Reagan extended this policy to large business contractors, and
Congress enacted this extension the same year. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-620, § 501(13), 98 Stat. 3335, 3367–68 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 210(c) (2006)); S. REP. NO.
98-662, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5799, 5800; Memorandum to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18,
1983).
183. See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 1669. This is, of course, a highly contested premise.
Some university inventions—including certain research tools—do not require additional
development for useful exploitation. In this context, patents may simply increase price and
decrease access with little offsetting social gain.
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patented inventions into commercial products. For universities,
however, patents were seen as a necessary conduit for transferring
federally funded technologies to the private sector for
commercialization. While grantees certainly benefitted from the Act,
federal funding agencies retained several rights in subject inventions.
For example, under the Act, agencies can prevent grantees from
184
taking title to patents in “exceptional circumstances.” Additionally,
agencies receive a paid-up nonexclusive license to practice subject
185
inventions and can “march-in” to compulsorily license inventions in
186
certain circumstances. Ultimately, the Act represented a significant
187
statutory and policy innovation. Among other effects, it created
enormous commercial opportunities for universities and reflected a
public policy of greater engagement between academia, the patent
188
system, and industry.
In addition to legislative reforms, scientific advances and the
changing nature of university research also helped accelerate
189
academic patenting. In particular, the birth of the biotechnology
190
industry in university laboratories helped fuel this trend. In the
1970s, Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of
the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) developed and
patented the pioneering techniques of recombinant DNA

184. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
185. Id. § 202(c)(4).
186. Id. § 203.
187. See Croissant & Smith-Doerr, supra note 16, at 693 (characterizing the 1980 passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act as marking a new “pivotal phase” in university-industry research
relationships); Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 464.
188. The Bayh-Dole Act was not the only legislation that helped encourage university
patenting. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (expanding universities’ ability to
conduct industry-sponsored research while maintaining tax-exempt status); Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 12, 100 Stat. 1785, 1785 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (enabling cooperative research and development agreements between
private entities and federal laboratories); Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2012)) (promoting the patenting and licensing of taxpayer-funded inventions at federal
laboratories).
189. See Richard Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at American
Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 14 (2001).
190. Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 61–62; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 793–94. See
generally Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 343–46.
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191

technology. Biotechnology generated enormous enthusiasm on
university campuses, as it promised significant therapies and large
192
revenues for academic patentees.
It also sparked increased
industrial support for university research. Between 1980 and 1983,
pharmaceutical companies contributed $140 million to research
193
conducted at thirteen universities. By 1990, genetic engineering and
recombinant DNA represented the technological class in which
194
universities owned the highest proportion of patents.
The emergence of biotechnology also reflected a shift in the
nature of university research. Toward the end of the twentieth
century, university researchers, particularly in the life sciences,
developed greater facility (and interest) in moving beyond the passive
observation of nature to actively manipulating the basic building
blocks of life. More broadly, much contemporary academic research
in the life sciences proceeds in “Pasteur’s Quadrant”: although it
seeks to elucidate “basic” knowledge, it also has immediate practical
195
implications. Due to the changing nature of university research,
even basic investigations can yield outputs that directly or with little
modification satisfy legal definitions of patentability.
Developments in the patent system also spurred greater
university patenting. In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Diamond v.
196
Chakrabarty that a genetically engineered bacterium comprised
197
patentable subject matter. In so doing, the Court articulated an
198
expansive conception of patentable subject matter
that
encompassed many of the fruits of the nascent biotechnology field (as
191. See generally Stanley N. Cohen, Annie C.Y. Chang, Herbert W. Boyer & Robert B.
Helling, Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973); Hughes, supra note 53.
192. Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons:
Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology, 35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427, 434
(1998). Notably, this vast commercial potential was based upon federally funded research.
KENNEY, supra note 58, at 241.
193. Blumenthal, supra note 29, at 2453.
194. Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 339.
195. See generally DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997); Francis Narin, Kimberly S. Hamilton & Dominic
Olivastro, The Increasing Linkage Between U.S. Technology and Public Science, 26 RES. POL’Y
317, 317 (1997); Rosenberg & Nelson, supra note 15, at 324.
196. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
197. Id. at 303.
198. See id. at 309 (suggesting that “‘anything under the sun that is made by man’” is eligible
for patenting (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399)).
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199

well other fields, such as computer science). As discussed further
below, this and other decisions widened the door for university
200
patents. Furthermore, just two years after Chakrabarty, Congress
201
established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
202
soon emerged as “a strong champion of patentholder rights.” The
Federal Circuit helped create a climate even more conducive to filing
patent applications, including those from university scientists.
Figure 1. Annual Utility Patent Grants As a Percentage of Utility
203
Patent Grants in 1970 (1970–2008)
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72,000

61,819

71,661

90,365

101,419

157,494

143,806

199. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 172, at 103; Bagley, supra note 37, at 235.
200. See infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text.
201. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 231; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
202. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 172, at 103.
203. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNIVERSITY-EXTENDED: NUMBER OF PATENTS
GRANTED BY YEAR OF PATENT GRANT, BREAKOUT BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (TABLE A1-1A)
AND BY OWNERSHIP CATEGORY (TABLE A1-1B) (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal);
Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart:
Calendar Years 1963–2012, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
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This constellation of legal, economic, and scientific developments
created a perfect storm that helped fuel a rapid rise in university
patenting after 1980. In 1965, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) granted 96 patents to 28 U.S. universities or related
204
institutions. In 1992, a little over a decade after the Act, the USPTO
granted almost 1,500 patents to over 150 U.S. universities or related
205
institutions. By 2002, academic institutions were receiving more
206
than 3,000 patents per year. From 1980 to 2005, the average number
of patents granted to U.S. research institutions increased by more
207
than 480 percent. The next Part considers the impact of this
development on the norms of university science and concomitant
doctrinal responses by courts in patent cases.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY LANDSCAPE: ACADEMIC
INTERNALIZATION AND THE DEMISE OF EXCEPTIONALISM
Whereas traditional relationships between universities and the
patent system were marked by segregation, they are now
characterized by a high degree of mutual internalization. This Part
briefly surveys the internalization of patents within academic culture,
a phenomenon that has attracted significant attention. It then focuses
on the less appreciated ways that university science has been
internalized within patent doctrine. Increasingly, academic
inventions, norms, and practices are the subject of patent litigation
and doctrine. And patent courts increasingly view universities as fully
integrated into the central, profit-oriented narrative of the patent
system. Ultimately, these normative and institutional shifts have
helped lead courts to reject academic exceptionalism in patent
doctrine.

204. Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a Source of
Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988, 80 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 119, 119 (1998).
205. Id.
206. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 179, at 851.
207. Gregory K. Sobolski, John H. Barton & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Technology Licensing:
Lessons from the US Experience, 294 JAMA 3137, 3137 (2005).
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A. Academic Science Viewing Patent Law: Increased Patenting and
Attendant Cultural Shifts
As legal, economic, and scientific developments pushed
universities deeper into the patent system, many academic institutions
and individuals underwent a notable cultural shift.
1. Evolving Norms and Universities’ Embrace of Patenting.
Through a long (and still ongoing) process of norm contestation,
academic culture has become much more receptive to exclusive rights
208
and the commercial exploitation of scientific knowledge. The rise in
patenting following the Bayh-Dole Act has challenged traditional
norms of openness and communal sharing and led to “the emergence
209
of new norms about how science should be done.” Although
universities used to be wary of patents, many now zealously embrace
210
them, and faculty members actively seek to exploit the “pecuniary
211
content of knowledge.” Professors Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew
Webster observe that “science and property, formerly independent
and even opposed concepts referring to distinctively different kinds of
activities and social spheres, have been made contingent upon each
212
other through the concept of ‘intellectual property rights.’” These
shifts mark a significant evolution away from the communalistic
norms Merton described in the early twentieth century.
Of course, although it is easy to characterize universities’
embrace of patenting as a stark break from prior practices, one
should not paint with too broad a brush. First, as noted above, the
notion that academia has always been a bastion of Mertonian sharing
213
norms may be unduly romantic. Second, strong antipatent norms
continue to persist (and will likely always persist) in some areas of
214
academia. Third, institutions and individuals are not monolithic, and
208. Such issues even appeared in debates leading up to the Bayh-Dole Act, when critics
warned that increasing commercialization at universities would erode scientific norms. Argyres
& Liebeskind, supra note 192, at 435–36.
209. Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 26; see Merges, supra note 7, at 146; Rai, supra note 7, at
109.
210. See Sampat, supra note 31, at 780–81.
211. Etzkowitz, supra note 23, at 27; see BOK, supra note 28, at 3.
212. Henry Etzkowitz & Andrew Webster, Science as Intellectual Property, in HANDBOOK
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 480, 480–81 (Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James
C. Petersen & Trevor Pinch eds., 1995); see Rowe, supra note 137, at 923.
213. See supra notes 38–39.
214. See BOK, supra note 28, at 140; NORBERT WIENER, INVENTION: THE CARE AND
FEEDING OF IDEAS 151 (1993); Lee, supra note 16, at 861; Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W.
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particular universities and scientists differ in their attitudes toward
215
Fourth, in some contexts,
patenting and commercialization.
traditional sharing and public interest norms have not been displaced,
but have been subtly adapted to a new default environment that
216
favors exclusive rights.
Notwithstanding these caveats, as a general matter, academic
institutions and individuals have become much more commercially
217
oriented. Prior to 1980, few universities systematically reviewed
218
laboratory work to find discoveries ripe for practical application.
The Bayh-Dole Act helped change this state of affairs and
219
encouraged universities to act more like commercial entities.
According to one commentator, “Universities have evolved from
220
public trusts into something closer to venture capital firms.” In the
formerly financially disinterested realm of academia, some scientists
have become jealous of colleagues who have translated academic
discoveries into personal wealth, a phenomenon known as the
221
“Porsche principle.”
At the personal level, embracing
commercialization has posed challenges for scientists steeped in
222
Mertonian
“role
identities.”
Some
scientists
delegate
Powell, Networks and Institutions, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALISM 596, 613–14 (Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin & Roy
Suddaby eds., 2008); Siegel et al., supra note 5, at 121; Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational
Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 244 (2012).
215. Sobolski et al., supra note 207, at 3138; see Maryann P. Feldman & Pierre Desrochers,
Truth for Its Own Sake: Academic Culture and Technology Transfer at Johns Hopkins
University, 42 MINERVA 105, 107 (2004) (describing how Johns Hopkins University, a major
recipient of research funds, has traditionally been skeptical of patenting and licensing).
216. See generally Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2225 (2009); Merges, supra note 7.
217. See, e.g., Karen Seashore Louis, David Blumenthal, Michael E. Gluck & Michael A.
Stoto, Entrepreneurs in Academe: An Exploration of Behaviors Among Life Scientists, 34
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 110, 110 (1989).
218. BOK, supra note 28, at 28.
219. Cf. Colyvas et al., supra note 21, at 62 (noting that the Bayh-Dole Act encouraged
universities to advertise inventions to industry).
220. Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, at 252.
221. Bob Tedeschi, The Idea Incubator Goes to Campus, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU1.
222. See generally Sanjay Jain, Gerald George & Mark Maltarich, Academics or
Entrepreneurs? Investigating Role Identity Modification of University Scientists Involved in
Commercialization Activity, 38 RES. POL’Y 922 (2009). Interestingly, researchers have found a
gender gap in scientists’ tendency to engage in patenting and commercial activities. See, e.g.,
Waverly W. Ding, Fiona Murray & Toby E. Stuart, From Bench to Board: Gender Differences in
University Scientists’ Participation in Corporate Scientific Advisory Boards, ACAD. MGMT. J.
(forthcoming), available at http://amj.aom.org/content/early/2012/10/09/amj.2011.0020; Waverly
W. Ding, Fiona Murray & Toby E. Stuart, Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life
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commercialization functions to other entities (such as graduate
students) and create “buffers” by establishing clear work priorities
and reaffirming their commitment to nonprofit science in order to
223
distance themselves from business activities. Interestingly, these
strategies parallel earlier institutional segregation within universities
that allowed them to retain their academic identities while delegating
patent management to independent entities.
Again, the emergence of biotechnology illustrates the evolution
of academic norms. Cohen and Boyer initially resisted patenting their
discovery of recombinant DNA technology, with Cohen being the
224
primary holdout. He relented, however, upon the persuasion of
225
Niels Reimers, head of Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing.
Notably, Cohen told Reimers that he would renounce any future
226
royalties arising from a patent. The scientists assigned the patent to
Stanford and UCSF, and it has gone on to become the most profitable
227
patent in both schools’ histories. By 1996, it had generated over
$150 million in royalties. Also emblematic of the times, Cohen and
Boyer’s involvement in commercialization extended well beyond
filing patent applications. Boyer and venture capitalist Robert
228
Swanson founded Genentech, a pioneer in the biotech industry, and
Cohen joined the scientific advisory board of Cetus, another
important early biotech company. In general, university scientists
229
have played formative roles in many leading biotech firms. With
patents as an important catalyst, academic scientists and universities
have become increasingly integrated in the commercial exploitation
of science.
2. Changes in Patent Policy. Universities’ growing openness to
commercial imperatives is reflected in changes to patent policy. As in
earlier times, official patent policies emphasize universities’ use of
Sciences, 313 SCIENCE 665, 665 (2006) (finding that female faculty scientists patent at about 40
percent the rate of male faculty scientists).
223. Jain et al., supra note 222, at 923.
224. Hughes, supra note 53, at 549–52.
225. See Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 12, at 264.
226. Hughes, supra note 53, at 550.
227. BOK, supra note 28, at 140; KENNEY, supra note 58, at 23.
228. Jeannette Colyvas, Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, Intellectual Property Rights
and Academic Health Centers, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING
STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 155, 160 (Ove
Granstand ed., 2003).
229. BOK, supra note 28, at 13.
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intellectual property to advance the public interest. Asserting
exclusivity and obtaining revenues, however, are also regarded as
230
legitimate functions of technology transfer. Furthermore, as noted
above, Harvard and several other leading research universities
dropped longstanding policies against patenting biomedical
discoveries in the 1970s. More broadly, universities have adopted
231
policies encouraging commercial activities by faculty members.
232
Further illustrating a notable cultural shift, some universities even
credit patents and commercialization activities in tenure and
233
promotion decisions. Commercialization and revenue generation
have become core parts of universities’ institutional missions: former
Duke University President Terry Sanford once noted that
‘“universities should do all that is reasonably possible to earn returns
on inventions, and should not be timid in making prudent business
234
arrangements to assure the largest fair return.’”
3. Contemporary Patenting Practices. Contemporary patent
practice by universities reflects new norms of exclusivity and
commercialization that would have been unfamiliar in the early
twentieth century. Case studies reflect a markedly aggressive attitude
toward obtaining patents, particularly on fundamental discoveries.
An examination of university patenting, however, reveals a
complicated normative environment in which universities
simultaneously seek profits while still serving traditional public
objectives.

230. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2010), available at http://otd.harvard.edu/resources/policies/IP/IPPolicy.pdf;
Stanford Univ., Research Policy Handbook: 5.1, DORESEARCH, http://doresearch.stanford.edu/
policies/research-policy-handbook/human-subjects-stem-cells-and-skeletal-remains-research/
human-0 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
231. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CAL., GUIDELINES ON UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONS 1 (1989),
available at http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/policy_pdf/IndRelGuidelines.PDF (“In
general, faculty members are encouraged to engage in appropriate outside professional
relationships with private industry.”).
232. See Lee, supra note 16, at 848; see also BOK, supra note 28, at 63.
233. See Jeannie Baumann, House Innovation Panel Hears Benefits of Bayh-Dole, Advances
in Tech Transfer, 84 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 344 (2012) (noting that the Board of
Regents of the University System of Maryland has modified tenure criteria to consider
commercialization activities).
234. Terry Sanford, The University and Technology: New Paths and New Perspectives, in 1
THE LAW OF BUSINESS AND LICENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1980S 1-63, 1-67 (Robert
Goldscheider and Tom Arnold eds., 1989).
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Returning to a familiar player, WARF has attracted significant
criticism for its patents on isolated human embryonic stem cells
(hESCs). In the late 1990s, James Thomson of the University of
Wisconsin obtained three patents on isolated hESCs and assigned
235
them to WARF. These cells have the capacity to develop into
almost all kinds of human tissue and thereby represent both
fundamental research tools as well as promising platforms for future
therapies. The patents “cede a remarkable amount of territory to
236
WARF,” and commentators have warned that they may inhibit
237
basic research and product development. WARF has actively
promoted commercialization of these cells: in exchange for $1 million
of sponsored research, it exclusively licensed six important cell types
238
that can be derived from these cell lines to Geron, a private firm.
WARF has, however, made efforts to enhance access to these
patented cells for nonprofit research. Due in part to public pressure,
WARF and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) negotiated a deal
by which federally funded scientists can utilize WARF cells for
research purposes, though the deal strictly restricts commercial
239
applications. WARF’s stem cell patents have attracted significant
criticism within the academic community and were the target of a
successful reexamination challenge, which ultimately invalidated one
240
of the patents and cast doubt on the others.
Perhaps even more controversial has been Columbia University’s
241
attempt to extend patent exclusivity on cotransformation. In the late

235. U.S. Patent No. 6,280,718 (filed Nov. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26,
1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996).
236. Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for
Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 174
(2002).
237. See Lee, supra note 110, at 85–86 (noting such warnings).
238. See Mueller, supra note 137, at 14; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 301 (2003).
239. Lee, supra note 110, at 927.
240. See John Conley, Allison Williams Dobson & Dan Vorhaus, WARF Reexamination
Takes Another Bite out of Biotech Patents, GENOMICS L. REP. (May 19, 2010), http://www.
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/05/19/warf-biotech-patents; Alla Katsnelson, Stem Cell
Patent Battle Continues, NEWSBLOG (May 3, 2012, 8:26 PM BST), http://blogs.nature.com/news/
2010/05/stem_cell_patent_battle_contin_1.html.
241. See Editorial, Ownership at Too High a Price?, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 953 (2003);
Ken Howard, Biotechs Sue Columbia over Fourth Axel Patent, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 955, 955
(2003); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1417–18 (2007); Bernard Wysocki Jr., Columbia’s Pursuit of Patent
Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at A1.
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1970s, neuroscientist Richard Axel and his colleagues at Columbia
patented cotransformation, a process for inserting exogenous DNA
into a host cell to produce particular proteins. They filed for a patent
242
in 1980, prior to the effective date of the Bayh-Dole Act. According
to pre-Act rules, NIH (which helped fund the research) allowed
Columbia to take title to the patent, but it cautioned the university
243
against engaging in repressive licensing practices.
Columbia’s
cotransformation patent has been highly lucrative, with several firms
244
paying over $300 million in combined licensing fees. When the
patent expired, Columbia announced that it had secured another
patent in 2002—which expires in 2019—that also covers
245
cotransformation technology. Several former licensees sued to
246
declare Columbia’s patent invalid and unenforceable, and Columbia
received significant criticism for its attempts to extend exclusivity
over this foundational research process.
Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical
Research have also received criticism for patenting a fundamental
biological process. In 2002, these academic institutions obtained a
broad patent on a basic biochemical pathway known as the NF-kB
247
cell-signaling pathway, which has been linked to a wide range of
diseases including cancer, osteoporosis, atherosclerosis, and
rheumatoid arthritis. The institutions exclusively licensed the patent
to Ariad Pharmaceuticals and joined with Ariad in suing several
248
pharmaceutical firms for infringement. Observers have criticized the
breadth of the NF-kB patent as well as the universities’ licensing
practices and decision to sue firms that are successfully
249
commercializing technologies related to it.
Finally, the story of Myriad Genetics has become emblematic to
many of the excesses of contemporary patenting. In the 1990s,
University of Utah researcher Mark Skolnick led a team that
sequenced BRCA1 and BRCA2, two genes related to breast and

242. Leaf, supra note 220, at 261.
243. Id.
244. Editorial, supra note 241, at 953.
245. Leaf, supra note 220, at 261.
246. See In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 343 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2004); Biogen Idec
MA Inc. v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 332 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D. Mass. 2004).
247. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 302.
248. See infra notes 357–61.
249. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 302.
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250

ovarian cancer. Shortly thereafter, the University of Utah and
Myriad Genetics, a biotechnology firm cofounded by Skolnick,
251
obtained several patents on these genes. Myriad Genetics has
received significant criticism for asserting its patents against medical
providers seeking to perform diagnostic tests involving BRCA1 and
252
BRCA2. In particular, public health and women’s advocates have
alleged that Myriad’s patents have raised the price and decreased the
availability of diagnostic testing. In 2009, various plaintiffs
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit
challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents on patentable subject
matter grounds. The case has attracted enormous attention as it has
worked its way up the federal courts, and the Supreme Court recently
253
invalidated Myriad’s patent claims covering isolated DNA.
Further
reflecting
their
aggressive
patent
practices,
contemporary universities have become active participants in
254
litigation. Empirical work by Professor Christopher Holman found
that from 2000 to 2009, there were 139 cases in which a university
joined a licensee in suing another party for patent infringement and
51 cases in which universities brought patent infringement suits on
255
their own. Follow-up work by Professor Jacob Rooksby found that
between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2010, 33 universities had
filed 57 separate patent infringement suits, often in conjunction with a
256
257
licensee.
The University of California,
the University of
250. Robert Dalpé, Louise Bouchard, Anne-Julie Houle & Louis Bédard, Watching the
Race To Find the Breast Cancer Genes, 28 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 187, 195–99 (2003);
Leaf, supra note 220, at 266.
251. Dalpé et al., supra note 250, at 195, 199; see Leaf, supra note 220, at 266. Interestingly,
an inventorship dispute with NIH was resolved when the University of Utah and Myriad agreed
to add certain NIH researchers to a patent application and share royalties with NIH. Dalpé et
al., supra note 250, at 196.
252. See, e.g., Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Robert Cook-Deegan, Commentary, Gene
Patents and Personalized Medicine—What Lies Ahead?, 1 GENOME MED. 92.1, 92.1 (2009).
253. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–18
(2013).
254. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 219 n.8; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing
in Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1016–18 (2006); Arti K. Rai, John R.
Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1552–55 (2009); Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and
Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents and How To Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 312, 338–40 (2013); Rowe, supra note 137, at 936–37.
255. Christopher M. Holman, Professor, UMKC School of Law, Presentation at Santa Clara
School of Law Symposium: University Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009) (presentation slides on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
256. Rooksby, supra note 254, at 330.
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262

Colorado, Cornell, Columbia, Harvard, MIT, the University
263
264
of Minnesota, and the University of Rochester have all been
involved in high-profile cases. Such litigation reveals a much more
aggressive, commercially oriented academic culture than in past eras.
Among other effects, such litigation has complicated universities’
265
relationships with various stakeholders. The political influence of a
prospective defendant may influence a university’s decision whether
266
to pursue litigation, particularly for public institutions. And in one
notable case, Micron responded to a patent infringement lawsuit by
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by announcing that it
267
would no longer recruit any students from that university.
Not surprisingly, universities have attracted criticism for
exploiting patent litigation for financial gain. For example, in Eolas
268
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the University of California
licensed a patent to a firm that is essentially a nonpracticing entity
269
(NPE), then sought to share a jury award of $520.6 million against
Microsoft before ultimately obtaining $30.4 million when the case
257. See, e.g., Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
258. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (involving Competitive Technologies, Inc., which represents the University of
Colorado and Cornell University).
259. Id. In a separate suit against Hewlett-Packard, Cornell obtained a jury verdict of $184
million in damages, which was later reduced to $71.3 million before the parties settled. Susan
Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, CORNELL CHRON. ONLINE
(June 9, 2012), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June10/HPCaseClosed.html.
260. In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 343 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2004).
261. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
262. Id. at 1336; Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F.
Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Mass. 2003); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Speedera Networks, Inc., No. CIV.A.0210188-RWZ, 2002 WL 1969657 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002).
263. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Minn.
1999); see Rowe, supra note 137, at 937 (noting that the litigation led to a $300 million
settlement for the University of Minnesota).
264. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
265. See Nelson, supra note 189, at 17 (noting tensions between companies supporting
academic research and universities claiming and asserting patent rights).
266. See Rooksby, supra note 254, at 347.
267. Dennis Crouch, Although “Without Tact,” Micron’s Retaliatory Decision To Stop
Hiring University of Illinois Graduates is Not Illegal, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/although-without-tact-microns-retaliatory-decision-to-stop-hiringuniversity-of-illinois-graduates-is-not-illegal.html.
268. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
269. NPEs, also referred to as patent trolls, are entities that hold patents but do not produce
any goods or services, relying on licensing fees and the threat of litigation for revenue.
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270

settled. Commenting on the case, a representative of the University
of California simply stated, “The University expects to be fairly
271
compensated for use of its patented technology.” These and other
activities have led patent scholars to question whether universities are
272
patent trolls. Indeed, nearly fifty universities have contractual
arrangements with Intellectual Ventures, one of the earliest and most
273
prominent NPEs.
Turning to licensing practices, an NIH study “concluded that
universities have sought just about every kind of clause in research
tool licenses to which they themselves have objected, including
publication restrictions, rights in or the option to license future
discoveries, and prohibition on transfer to other institutions or
274
scientists.” As a general matter, Professor Mark Lemley identifies
“a felt sense among a lot of people that universities are not good
275
actors in the patent system.”
The normative landscape of university patenting, however, is
quite complicated. Though universities have certainly become more
aggressive in obtaining and asserting patents, particularly on
“foundational” resources, vestiges of academic norms persist. Some
technology transfer offices (TTOs) decline to patent fundamental
research tools precisely to facilitate their wide availability to the

270. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008). The University of California stood to receive 25 percent of the
proceeds from the verdict. Michael Kanellos & Jim Hu, Microsoft Ordered To Pay $521 million,
CNET (Aug. 11, 2003 5:29 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1012-5062409.html; see Todd Bishop,
Microsoft’s Eolas Settlement: UC Gets $30.4m, MICROSOFT BLOG (Oct. 10, 2007 5:02 PM),
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2007/10/10/microsofts-eolas-settlement-uc-gets-30-4m.
271. See Questions and Answers About UC/Eolas Patent Infringement Suit Against
Microsoft, U. CAL., http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/9812 (last visited Aug. 26,
2013).
272. Lemley, supra note 270, at 618; see Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1522–23 (“Additionally,
because universities, and sometimes even their exclusive licensees, are nonmanufacturing
patentees, the intense debate over whether such patentees employ ‘holdup’ strategies
deleterious to innovation when they assert patents against successful commercializers directly
implicates universities.”).
273. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf.
274. Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1081 (2005) (citing NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4,
1998), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/NIH/researchtools/Report98.htm).
275. Lemley, supra note 270, at 619.
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276

scientific community. At the enforcement level, universities holding
277
patents often assert far less than their full exclusionary force. And
although universities have been involved in high-profile litigation
278
against companies, they have generally not sued other universities.
Furthermore, in the licensing realm, universities are utilizing
their patents in somewhat publicly spirited ways to advance
279
noncommercial research and distributive objectives. As I have
described elsewhere, many TTOs retain research exemptions when
280
licensing their technology to others. That is, even when a university
exclusively licenses a technology to a private firm, it will retain the
right to utilize this invention for nonprofit research and to grant
281
licenses to other nonprofit research institutions to do the same. In
this manner, universities are creating a contractual experimental use
282
exception by embedding research safe harbors in patent licenses.
Additionally, some universities have expanded access to patented
technologies—particularly health-related technologies—for low283
income populations.
One example involves Yale University’s
renegotiation of its exclusive license for a patented anti-AIDS
284
medication to allow for lower prices in South Africa. Furthermore,
universities are increasingly including humanitarian provisions in
licenses to enhance access to patented health technologies for
285
vulnerable populations. Several years ago, Stanford University
convened an influential working group of leading TTOs to identify

276. See Rai, supra note 7, at 112 (noting that Harvard and Stanford do not file patent
applications on expressed sequence tags (ESTs)).
277. Merges, supra note 7, at 150.
278. They have, however, been involved in interferences. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Univ. of Iowa Res. Found., 455 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
279. Peter Lee, Contracting To Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 944–46 (2009).
280. Id. at 945; see Lori Pressman, Richard Burgess, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Stephen J.
McCormack, Io Nami-Wolk, Melissa Soucy & LeRoy Walters, The Licensing of DNA Patents
by Large US Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 35 (2009)
(“The 19 respondent academic institutions retain research-use rights themselves and insist on
the right to transfer these research-use rights to other nonprofit institutions.”).
281. See, e.g., Licensing Harvard Patent Rights: A Guideline to the Essentials of Harvard’s
License Agreements, HARVARD U. OFF. TECH. DEV., http://www.techtransfer.harvard.edu/
resources/guidelines/license (last visited Aug. 26, 2013); Exclusive Agreement, ¶ 3.4, available at
http://otl.stanford.edu/documents/revstdagmt.pdf (last visited July 30, 2013).
282. Lee, supra note 279, at 946.
283. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 978.
284. Id. at 980; see Kapczynski et al., supra note 274, at 1034–37.
285. Lee, supra note 283, at 981–82.
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various licensing best practices, such as research and humanitarian
286
exceptions. While university patenting is much more explicitly
commercial than in past generations, universities are conscientiously
using patents to “push” certain noncommercial, academic norms into
287
the marketplace.
Ironically, these progressive licensing practices, which advance
noncommercial values, are helping to drag universities deeper into
patent litigation. Under U.S. patent law, ordinarily only a party
288
holding legal title to a patent may sue for infringement. In some
cases, exclusive licensees may hold sufficient rights in a patent to
allow them to bring suit without joining the original patentee.
However, when a licensor, such as a university, retains substantial
rights in an invention, it may be required to join litigation before a
289
licensee can bring an enforcement action. This was the case in
290
AsymmetRx v. Biocare Medical, LLC, in which the Federal Circuit
held that AsymmetRx, which had licensed patents from Harvard
University, did not have standing to bring an infringement suit
291
without Harvard’s participation.
In its licenses, Harvard had
retained the right to use the subject inventions for noncommercial
research as well as the right to grant additional licenses if
292
AsymmetRx failed to meet various commercialization milestones.
The court held that because of these retained rights, AsymmetRx
could only bring an infringement suit if Harvard joined as a plaintiff.
Tellingly, the court acknowledged the public-interest objectives of
Harvard’s retained rights, noting that these license provisions “may
also reflect the perceived needs of a university attempting to balance
the public interest with commercializing the results of its professors’
293
research.” Nonetheless, these retained rights have the effect of
further pushing universities to participate in patent litigation.
286. CAL INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN
LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/
news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf.
287. See Lee, supra note 216, at 2229. See generally Lee, supra note 283.
288. See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
289. Id. at 1131. See generally Rooksby, supra note 254.
290. AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
291. See id. at 1322 (“We thus conclude that Harvard did not convey all substantial rights
under the ’256 and ’227 patents to AsymmetRx in the AsymmetRx License, and, as a result,
AsymmetRx lacks statutory standing, on its own, to bring an infringement suit against
Biocare.”).
292. Id. at 1316.
293. Id. at 1321.
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4. Shifts in Institutional Structure. Whereas early forays into
patenting were marked by institutional segregation of academic and
294
patenting functions, the guiding theme in recent times is integration.
To begin, universities’ embrace of patenting has resulted in significant
infrastructure building, most notably the establishment of hundreds
295
of TTOs on university campuses.
Unlike earlier eras when
universities sought to distance themselves from actively managing
patents and licenses, these days, university officials are directly
296
involved in such activities.
Furthermore, patents and commercialization have fostered a
wealth of connections between university and industry. The Bayh297
Dole Act “revolutionized” university-industry relations; one 1996
survey found that “over 90 percent of life-science companies in the
298
United States had some relationship with academia.” Oftentimes,
commercial firms sponsor research at universities in exchange for
exclusive licenses or options on any resulting patented inventions.
Reflecting more aggressive institution building, entities such as the
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at MIT reflect “an
attempt to create an inter-penetrating system of public and private
299
research within a university setting.” Furthermore, universities have
created “proof of concept centers” to help bridge the gap between
300
research outputs and commercial products. Indeed, convergence in
the organization of academic and industrial research has led to
“exchange of personnel, common research projects and, in some
301
cases, large-scale joint ventures.” The trend of universities taking
equity stakes in companies that license their patents further reflects

294. Cf. Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 416.
295. See Nelson, supra note 189, at 13.
296. See Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 420; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 31, at 811.
297. Press & Washburn, supra note 12, at 41; see Etzkowitz, supra note 41, at 416. Ironically,
companies have at times opposed university patenting and the sharp business practices of
university licensors. See id. at 395–96.
298. David Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell & Karen Seashore Louis,
Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry
Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996).
299. Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 192, at 448; see Stephen Heuser, Harvard Woos
Firms To Fund Research, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2005, at 1 (describing Harvard University’s
aggressive campaign to increase sponsored research).
300. See EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., PROOF OF CONCEPT CENTERS:
ACCELERATING THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY INNOVATION 2 (2008), available at
http://sites.kauffman.org/pdf/POC_Centers_01242008.pdf.
301. Louis et al., supra note 217, at 114.
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the theme of academic-commercial integration. In some instances,
these ties linking faculty inventors, universities, and licensee firms
approach vertical integration of universities and commercial
303
partners.
Indeed, patent-mediated technology transfer necessarily involves
a high degree of personal contact between faculty inventors and
304
licensees. The need to transfer patent-related “tacit knowledge,” for
example, helps explain the important role of star academic scientists
in founding and leading new biotechnology firms (many of which
305
license university patents). Moving beyond personal connections,
the very cultures of academia and industry are beginning to converge.
Research scientists move frequently between universities and
industry, faculty members take sabbaticals at companies, and
biotechnology firms mimic academic culture by creating postdoctoral
306
fellowships. Although not all of these trends are attributable to
patenting per se, the profusion of patents has been part and parcel of
a general cultural convergence of academia and industry.
***
As reflected in norms, policy, and practice, universities and their
scientists have become much more receptive to patenting and
commercialization relative to the pre-Bayh-Dole Act era. Norms of
307
open science have eroded, universities have routinely patented
foundational research tools and engaged in litigation, and
institutional connections between universities and industry have

302. Maryann Feldman, Irwin Feller, Janet Bercovitz & Richard Burton, Equity and the
Technology Transfer Strategies of American Research Universities, 48 MGMT. SCI. 105, 105
(2002).
303. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1556–57 (2012); cf.
Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources,
Characteristics, and Financing, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 55, 64 (1995) (“[P]ractically all of the
cited academic researchers were involved in consulting relationships with firms, which helped to
stimulate many of the ideas and topics taken up . . . .”).
304. Lee, supra note 303, at 1527–28.
305. Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer, Intellectual Human Capital
and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 290, 302 (1998); Lynne G.
Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: Patterns of
Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 93 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 12,709, 12,710 (1996).
306. Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 12, at 263.
307. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 310.
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deepened. Although vestiges of academic and public-interest norms
308
remain, the baseline has changed as universities have become
309
“active participants in the business of science.” In addition to
important substantive changes, universities have also undergone an
important evolution in how they are perceived by the outside public.
Universities have long played a rhetorically important role in society
as vanguards of disinterested academic inquiry. However, “[a]s
universities become more identified with commercial wealth, they
310
also lose their uniqueness in society.” Indeed, universities’ embrace
of patenting and commercial ventures has been reflected in patent
doctrine, helping to define a new equilibrium between patents and
311
the university.
B. Patent Law Viewing Academic Science: Doctrinal Internalization
and the Demise of Exceptionalism
Just as academic science has internalized patents, patent doctrine
has internalized academic science. Academic inventions, inventors,
and practices are now frequent subjects of patent doctrine.
Furthermore, courts increasingly view universities as integrated into
the mainstream commercial narrative of the patent system. Since
1980—the year of the Bayh-Dole Act—courts in patent cases have
consistently rejected distinctions between universities and other,
typically commercial, actors. Importantly, the evolving normative
status of universities has played a significant role in the erosion of
academic exceptionalism. Whereas uniquely academic norms,
practices, and policies helped justify exceptional treatment of
universities in earlier generations, modern courts view universities as
much more akin to commercial entities and treat them accordingly.
1. Eroding Doctrinal Hedges. As mentioned above, patent
doctrine itself has played a key role in erasing distinctions between

308. See supra notes 276–87 and accompanying text.
309. Gary P. Pisano, Can Science Be a Business? Lessons from Biotech, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Oct. 2006, at 114, 116; see KENNEY, supra note 58, at 246; Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia
Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at BU4.
310. Phillip A. Sharp, The Biomedical Sciences in Context, in THE FRAGILE CONTRACT:
UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 146, 148 (David H. Guston &
Kenneth Keniston eds., 1994).
311. See Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 464–65 (“[U]niversities have begun to reach further
upstream for patents and to take a harder line on licensing, which makes them look even more
commercial—and even less sympathetic to the Federal Circuit.”).
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academic science and other types of technological work and bringing
universities into the patent fold. In particular, the Supreme Court’s
1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty marks a turning point in
relations between patents and the university. Although Chakrabarty
did not deal with an academic invention, its holding that genetically
312
modified living organisms comprise patentable subject matter, and
its generally expansive approach to patent eligibility, significantly
impacted universities. Notably, the University of California as well as
a consortium of academic scientists and institutions had submitted
amicus briefs arguing in favor of patentability and stressing the
313
importance of patents in commercializing academic inventions.
Among other effects, Chakrabarty helped “galvaniz[e] the rush into
314
315
biotechnology.” Its famous (though, perhaps flawed ) articulation
of patentable subject matter as covering “‘anything under the sun that
is made by man’” encompassed many university discoveries in fields
316
as diverse as biotechnology and computer science. Other patentable
subject matter decisions establishing the patent eligibility of software317
318
related inventions and plants further widened the door for
university patents.
In addition, case law of the Federal Circuit also helped usher
universities into the patent system. In earlier eras, the doctrine of
utility had operated as a significant bulwark separating upstream,
319
embryonic academic discoveries from patentable technologies. In In
320
re Brana, however, the Federal Circuit held that compounds
showing therapeutic effects in artificial, nonhuman “tumor models”
321
satisfied the utility requirement, thus widening the door for
patenting upstream biomedical inventions quite removed from
human application. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit adopted a
rather lax approach to the nonobviousness requirement for DNA
inventions, holding that a claimed DNA may be nonobvious even

312. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
313. Kevles, supra note 41, at 302–03.
314. KENNEY, supra note 58, at 190.
315. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248–49 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
316. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
317. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1980).
318. Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645-91, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 443 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 1985).
319. See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
320. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
321. Id. at 1565.
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when the protein that it codes for as well as methods of gene cloning
322
are in the prior art. Such doctrine further facilitated patenting the
fruits of biotechnology, a particularly active area of university
research. These doctrinal developments have played a key role in
323
further integrating university discoveries within the patent system.
As universities entered the patent system en masse, the question
arose as to whether patent doctrine should treat them differently than
other actors, as it did in certain contexts in earlier times. Not
surprisingly, universities have often argued for preferential treatment
within the patent system, sometimes based on the perceived policy
goals of the Act. Contemporary courts, however, have routinely
rejected academic exceptionalism. Part of this development merely
reflects courts’ rejection of overreaching arguments from a new class
of university litigants. But it also reflects courts’ recognition (and
reinforcement) of changing academic norms and the integration of
324
universities into the traditional commercial narrative of patents.
2. Rejecting Academic Exceptionalism.
a. Priority. For example, the Federal Circuit has refused to
extend special treatment to university researchers in the context of
determining priority of invention. In the 1987 case of Griffith v.
325
Kanamaru, the court considered a priority dispute between Griffith,
an associate professor at Cornell University Medical College, and
326
Kanamaru, an employee of Takeda Chemical Industries. Both
322. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999).
323. In many respects, the treatment of university science in the patent system follows
broader structural trends, such as the Federal Circuit’s early enthusiasm for patents. This
remains true of more recent trends, such as the recent narrowing of patentability in Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
324. This commercial characterization has also arisen in determining whether public
universities can enjoy sovereign immunity from patent suits. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is also a factor to be considered that
the university’s [technology transfer] actions are not at the core of the educational/research
purposes for which the university was chartered as an arm of the state . . . .”). In other contexts
as well, contemporary courts have been reluctant to extend any exceptional treatment to
universities, which are increasingly seen as typical commercial actors. Cf. United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting any exemption of universities from
substantive antitrust scrutiny in the context of collusively determining financial aid); Madison et
al., supra note 31, at 395–96 (discussing the antitrust litigation against universities).
325. Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
326. Id. at 625.
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parties claimed to have been the first inventor of the technology at
issue. The key question was whether Griffith, who had conceived of
the invention first, had been “diligent” over an appropriate period of
327
time before reducing the invention to practice. Griffith justified his
delay by claiming that he needed to obtain additional research funds
328
as well as wait to employ a particular graduate student. In doing so,
he implicitly argued that the particularities of university research
warranted relaxed application of the diligence requirement. As
interpreted by the court, Griffith’s arguments “suggest[ed] that, as a
policy matter, universities should not be treated as businesses, which
329
ultimately would detract from scholarly inquiry.” The Federal
Circuit, however, rejected this argument and refused to draw
distinctions between academic and commercial enterprises. It held
that Griffith had not been diligent in reducing the invention to
330
practice and that he could not claim priority.
The opinion took the unusual step of commenting on an article
by Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University, upon which
Griffith had relied in his arguments. Contrary to Griffith’s
interpretation, the Federal Circuit observed that “Bok does not ask
that the patent laws or other intellectual property law be skewed or
slanted to enable the university to have its cake and eat it too, i.e., to
act in a noncommercial manner and yet preserve the pecuniary
331
rewards of commercial exploitation for itself.” The court’s implicit
message was that if universities avail themselves of the benefits of the
patent system, then they will be held to the same standards as any
other entity. Indeed, in applying strict standards of diligence to
universities, the court acknowledged that it might encourage

327. Id. at 626. Conception refers to the mental aspects of invention. See Technitrol, Inc. v.
United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Reduction to practice refers to the physical
aspects of invention; for instance, building a physical embodiment of an invention. See DSL
Dynamic Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1991). These
concepts governed the determination of priority in cases, such as this one, in which the relevant
patent applications were filed before the effective date of the revised novelty provisions of the
America Invents Act (AIA). Within this traditional regime, in the case in which one party was
the first to conceive but the second to reduce an invention to practice, that party would prevail if
she was diligent from a time prior to the other party’s conception through to her own reduction
to practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub.
L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
328. Griffith, 816 F.2d at 626.
329. Id. at 627.
330. Id. at 629.
331. Id. at 628.
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university scientists to act more like commercial actors in prioritizing
332
certain lines of research at the expense of others.
b. Statutory Bars. The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to make
exceptions for university research even extends to an activity that
333
rests at the heart of academia: scientific presentations. In In re
334
Klopfenstein, the Federal Circuit considered whether a scientist’s
presentations at two academic meetings constituted “printed
publications” that would statutorily bar a later filed patent
335
application.
These presentations were comprised of oral
commentary as well as slides pasted onto poster board that were
336
displayed for at most two-and-a-half days. Considering multiple
337
factors,
the court held that the slides constituted printed
338
publications that statutorily barred Klopfenstein’s patent. The court
did, however, exhibit some sensitivity to the unique norms of
academic presentations. It noted, for example, that an entirely oral
presentation would not constitute a printed publication and that a
transient display of slides on a screen would not necessarily constitute
339
a printed publication. Furthermore, the opinion stated, “Where
professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable
expectation that the information displayed will not be copied, we are
more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’ This

332. See id. (“Cornell has consciously chosen to assume the risk that priority in the invention
might be lost to an outside inventor, yet, having chosen a noncommercial policy, it asks us to
save it the property that would have inured to it if it had acted in single-minded pursuit of
gain.”).
333. Under the prevailing novelty and statutory bar provisions prior to the AIA—which is
still the relevant law for patent applications filed before March 16, 2013—printed publications
describing an invention that arise more than one year before an inventor files a patent
application will “statutorily bar” a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011). Under the first-inventorto-file regime of the AIA, statutory bars are essentially subsumed into novelty analysis. See
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102).
334. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
335. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 243–44; Sean B. Seymore, The Printed Publication Bar
After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About
Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 509 (2007).
336. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1347.
337. These factors included “the length of time the display was exhibited, the expertise of
the target audience, the existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material
displayed would not be copied, and the simplicity or ease with which the material displayed
could have been copied.” Id. at 1350.
338. Id. at 1352.
339. Id. at 1349 n.4.
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reluctance helps preserve the incentive for inventors to participate in
340
academic presentations or discussions.” Nonetheless, Klopfenstein’s
temporary poster displays statutorily barred the patent.
Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s nod to academic norms,
commentators have warned that the court’s broad conception of
printed publications may chill academic presentations and force
341
scientists to delay sharing research results. Noting that “patent rules
too often are dictating the pace, form, and scope of discourse and
sometimes even the direction of the research itself,” Professor Margo
Bagley advocates altering the novelty rules of both U.S. and foreign
342
patent systems to better accommodate academic practices. Existing
patent doctrine, however, has been less solicitous of such academic
exceptionalism, and it continues to exert a constraining effect on
rapid publication of scientific findings.
c. The Written Description Requirement. In a series of cases, the
Federal Circuit has rejected preferential treatment for university
inventions in establishing a stringent written description requirement
for biomedical technologies. Under prevailing law, patent claims must
correspond to the “written description” of an invention appearing in
343
the patent specification. In 1997, the Federal Circuit established a
high bar for the written description requirement for DNA-based
inventions. In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &
344
Co., the court invalidated several University of California patent
claims related to genetically engineered plasmids and microorganisms
345
that produce insulin. Noting that the University of California’s
patent described complementary DNA (cDNA) that produced rat
346
insulin, the Federal Circuit invalidated the University of California’s
broader claims covering cDNA that produced vertebrate and mammal

340. Id. at 1351; see also Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333–34 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (citing In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351) (noting that academic norms created an
expectation of confidentiality regarding the review of a scientific manuscript).
341. Bagley, supra note 37, at 221.
342. Id. at 223–24, 269.
343. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
344. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
345. Id. at 1562.
346. Complementary DNA is comprised of only the DNA sequences of a gene that actually
code for a particular protein, with noncoding DNA (introns) removed. See Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207–08 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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insulin. In addition to spurring significant doctrinal controversy,
Regents of the University of California is notable for imposing
constraints on DNA-related inventions, an area of significant
university patenting.
In another case involving the written description requirement,
the Federal Circuit expressly rejected special treatment for university
348
inventions. In University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., the
Federal Circuit invalidated Rochester’s patent on COX-2 inhibitors,
an important class of anti-inflammatory medications, on written
349
description grounds. Although the patent claimed a process for
inhibiting COX-2 (an enzyme related to inflammation), it did not
350
disclose an actual COX-2 inhibitor that could perform this function.
Notably, the court rejected Rochester’s calls to interpret the written
description requirement leniently for university inventions.
According to Rochester, an unduly strict written description
requirement would “vitiate[] universities’ ability to bring pioneering
351
innovations to the public,” thus undermining the Bayh-Dole Act’s
352
objective of commercializing academic inventions. The University
of California and the University of Texas joined this argument as
amici, asserting that a high written description requirement would
353
jeopardize university technology transfer. The court, however,
refused to bend the rules for university inventions. It flatly noted that
the Act “was not intended to relax the statutory requirements for
354
patentability” to benefit university patentees. Notwithstanding the

347. In particular, it sparked a robust debate regarding whether the written description
requirement should apply to original as well as amended claims (as the Federal Circuit so
construed) or whether it should only apply to amended claims. See Peter Lee, Antiformalism at
the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405,
420 (2012).
348. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
349. Id. at 917.
350. Id. at 930.
351. Id. at 929.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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355

burdens on university patentees, the Federal Circuit has insisted on
356
a high written description standard for biomedical inventions.
The Federal Circuit continued to reject academic exceptionalism
in a 2010 en banc case, Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
357
Co. As noted, Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for
Biomedical Research obtained a broad patent on a basic biochemical
pathway known as the NF-kB cell-signaling pathway, then exclusively
358
licensed it to Ariad. Ariad and the universities sued Eli Lilly and
others for infringement, but a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit
held that certain claims in Ariad’s patent were invalid for failing the
359
written description requirement. Upon en banc review, the Federal
Circuit affirmed, clarifying (against the universities’ arguments) that
the written description requirement exists as an independent criterion
360
of patentability alongside enablement. Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit rejected the patentees’ policy argument that a stringent
written description requirement would disfavor universities, whose
scientists often discover upstream, basic inventions for which
providing an adequate written description is particularly difficult:
Much university research relates to basic research, including
research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action, and
universities may not have the resources or inclination to work out
the practical implications of all such research, i.e., finding and
identifying compounds able to affect the mechanism discovered.
361
That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention.

Notwithstanding the somewhat unique nature of academic research,
the Federal Circuit has frequently maintained that it will treat
university patentees no differently than other players in the patent

355. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Must a university or small biotech
company expend scarce resources to produce every potential nucleotide sequence that exhibits
their inventive functions?”).
356. See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122–28 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (invalidating Carnegie Mellon’s patents on novel recombinant plasmids and related
inventions on written description grounds).
357. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
358. See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
359. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d on
reh’g en banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (2010).
360. Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1343.
361. Id. at 1353 (citation omitted).
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d. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception. Turning from
patentability to infringement, a particularly visible example of
contemporary patent doctrine’s rejection of academic exceptionalism
is the Federal Circuit’s narrow conception of the experimental use
exception. As discussed above, courts have traditionally exempted
noncommercial, experimental uses of patented inventions from
362
infringement. In at least one case, this exemption appeared to apply
363
to university research involving patented inventions. Whether or
not true as a doctrinal matter, many academic scientists believed that
their noncommercial research qualified as noninfringing experimental
use. In more recent times, however, courts have articulated a rather
364
narrow conception of the exception. In 1984, in a case not involving
academic research, the Federal Circuit characterized the
experimental use exception as “truly narrow” and cautioned against
construing it “so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in
the guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite,
365
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.” In a 2000
concurrence, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit even declared that
“the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental
366
use excuses for infringement.”
This trend came to a head in 2002, when the Federal Circuit
directly addressed the experimental use exception’s application to
367
university research. In Madey v. Duke University, the court rejected
Duke University’s invocation of the experimental use defense in a
368
patent infringement suit brought by a former faculty member. The
Federal Circuit noted that Duke’s ongoing research projects involving
Madey’s patented laser “unmistakably further [Duke’s] legitimate
business objectives, including educating and enlightening students

362. See supra notes 137–50 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding
defendant liable for patent infringement even when it used the invention for “testing,
evaluational, demonstrational or experimental purposes”).
365. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
366. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.2d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
concurring); see Mueller, supra note 137, at 28–30.
367. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
368. Id. at 1362.
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369

and faculty participating in these projects.” The court’s language is
striking in highlighting the “business objectives” of a nonprofit
research university. The opinion further notes that “Duke . . . like
other major research institutions of higher learning, is not shy in
pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives
370
a not insubstantial revenue stream.” Indeed, Duke’s status as a
371
nonprofit institution was immaterial to resolving this case.
Among other implications, Madey is notable for reflecting a new
normative vision of universities as commercial entities. As Professors
Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg note,
“Perhaps because of their increasing commercial entanglements,
universities were no longer seen by the court as inhabiting a
372
distinctive, noncommercial realm.”
The Federal Circuit’s
conception of the modern research university diverges sharply from
“Justice Story’s early-19th-century picture of a gentleman scientist
373
driven by idle curiosity.” In contemporary times, universities have
“shed their noncommercial innocence to reach deeper into the
374
pockets of commercial firms.” After Madey, universities and their
scientists largely lost whatever privileged normative status they may
375
have enjoyed, particularly their claim to “disinterested stewardship
376
of knowledge in the public interest.” In the context of infringement,
universities’ embrace of patenting and commercialization has helped
courts reject academic exceptionalism.
e. Remedies. In addition to the Federal Circuit, other courts—
notably the Supreme Court—have also rejected academic
exceptionalism. In determining remedies for patent infringement, the
Supreme Court has recently suggested that universities should be
treated just like any other actor in the patent system. The Court
377
articulated these views in the 2006 case of eBay v. MercExchange,
which established a four-factor equitable test to determine the

369. Id. at 1363.
370. Id. at 1362 n.7.
371. Rowe, supra note 137, at 931.
372. Madison et al., supra note 31, at 395.
373. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1018.
374. Id.
375. See Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 377 (noting that after the decision in Madey, “no one,
not even academics, are [sic] above the intellectual property laws”).
376. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1019.
377. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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appropriateness of injunctive relief following a finding of patent
378
infringement. Notably, the Court stated,
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made
inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather
than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring
their works to market themselves. Such patent holders may be able
to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for
379
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.

Thus, even though universities do not produce any products, they
may still be eligible to receive injunctions against parties infringing
380
their patents. Although a per se rule prohibiting injunctions for
university patentees would have been rather surprising, the Court’s
lumping together of universities and other inventive entities tends to
elide any historical distinctiveness of universities in the patent system.
Indeed, the Court’s statement that university patentees may obtain
injunctive relief actually facilitates their status as NPEs that has
attracted so much criticism.
In applying eBay to academic patentees, lower courts have also
highlighted the commercial nature of academic institutions. In
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v.
381
Buffalo Technology Inc., the Eastern District of Texas granted a
permanent injunction to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO), a nonprofit scientific research
foundation established by the Australian government, after finding
382
that Buffalo Technologies had infringed one of CSIRO’s patents.
383
Though not a university, CSIRO is a nonprofit academic institution,
and this decision provides an indication of how courts are likely to
treat universities under the eBay framework. Applying eBay, the

378. Id. at 391.
379. Id. at 393.
380. Not surprisingly, academic representatives argued in congressional testimony that
universities should be eligible to receive injunctive relief even though universities do not
manufacture any products. See Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 41–42 (2005)
[hereinafter Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing] (statement of Carl
Gulbrandsen, Exec. Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.).
381. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc. (CSIRO), 492
F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
382. Id. at 608.
383. CSIRO is not a university but is analogous to the United States National Science
Foundation or NIH. Id.; see Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1559–60.
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court ruled that CSIRO would be irreparably harmed by Buffalo’s
continued infringement in the form of delayed funding and lost
384
opportunities to advance technological projects. The court noted
that CSIRO faces competitive pressures to obtain resources, ideas,
and personnel and that infringement of its patent may place CSIRO
385
at a competitive disadvantage. In ruling that monetary damages
were inadequate, the court explicitly compared CSIRO to a
commercial enterprise, noting that CSIRO’s “reputation as a research
institution has been impugned just as another company’s brand
386
recognition or good will may be damaged.” The case is notable both
for demonstrating that nonpracticing academic patentees may obtain
387
injunctive relief and for the markedly commercial characterization
of such institutions.
f. Ownership of Federally Funded Inventions. More recently, the
Supreme Court also rejected special treatment for universities in a
case involving the ownership of federally funded patents. In Board of
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular
388
Systems, Inc., the Court considered whether the Bayh-Dole Act
vests title to university inventions directly in universities themselves
389
or whether title initially vests in faculty inventors. Stanford argued
that the Act reflects a federal policy in favor of university-based
technology transfer and that it vests title to inventions directly in
390
universities themselves. The Association of American Universities,
the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of
Public and Land-grant Universities, the Association of University

384. CSIRO, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 605.
387. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
631, 655 (2007). From one perspective, this may represent an instance of academic
exceptionalism, as universities have achieved higher-than-average rates of obtaining injunctions
relative to other NPEs. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (2012); see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 139
(“[A]n aberrational Texas district court . . . held that special rules should apply to nonprofit
entities.”). Although this may be interpreted as exceptionalism, it may also reflect courts’
lumping together of universities with traditional commercial patentees (that is, productive,
innovative entities) as opposed to grouping them with less favorable NPEs.
388. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188 (2011).
389. Id. at 2192.
390. Brief of Petitioner at 30, 38, Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159).
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Technology Managers, and the Council on Government Relations all
391
supported Stanford’s argument. The Court, however, disagreed. It
held that the Act did not modify longstanding patent doctrine
regarding the ownership of inventions, which vests title to inventions
392
in inventors themselves. Applying the general law of patent
ownership to university inventions, the Court again rejected academic
exceptionalism.
3. The Integration of Universities Within Patent Doctrine. In
several ways, patent decisions from the past three decades reflect the
internalization of academic science within patent doctrine. Expansive
approaches to patentability and the changing nature of university
research have created an environment in which many outputs of
academic research now fall within the patent system’s regulatory
grasp. Academic science—previously peripheral to the patent
system—is now a frequent subject of litigation and doctrine. Indeed,
academic science has played a key role in shaping cutting-edge patent
doctrine. To be sure, courts have used doctrines governing priority,
statutory bars, and the written description requirement to invalidate
university patents. However, courts have applied these doctrines not
based on a principled stance that academic discoveries are
categorically inappropriate for patenting, but to rebuff overreaching
behavior by zealous university patentees.
During this period, courts have largely rejected academic
exceptionalism. In some cases, this rejection has been based on a
more commercially oriented conception of universities. Earlier
doctrinal hedges separating the patent system from academic science
were often predicated on conceptions of academic entities as
nonpecuniary stewards of the public interest. In recent decades,
however, court opinions have reflected a new reality, lumping
universities and scientists together with commercial, revenue-seeking
entities. In a variety of doctrinal contexts—perhaps most notably the
common law experimental use exception—courts have treated
universities as just another set of commercial actors in the patent
system. Here again, patent law exhibits some degree of reciprocity
between norms and doctrine: to the extent that universities have shed

391. Brief of Ass’n of Am. Univs. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–5,
Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159).
392. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at 2199.
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traditional academic norms and embraced commercialism, patent
courts will not treat them any differently from other parties.
Of course, one must place these developments within the context
of broader trends in patent law. In many ways, universities’
integration into the patent system was part and parcel of the patentfriendly doctrine of the Supreme Court and especially the Federal
393
Circuit in the 1980s and 1990s. Expansive interpretations of
patentable subject matter, utility, and nonobviousness helped extend
patent protection to more university discoveries, thus fueling the
institutional changes to which courts later responded. Interestingly,
universities have also been caught up in the more recent trend of both
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit narrowing patentability
since the late 1990s. Decisions constraining patentable subject
394
395
396
matter, utility, nonobviousness, and (as discussed above) the
397
written description requirement have made it more difficult to
obtain patents. In some respects, these changes have
disproportionately impacted university inventions, which tend to be
rather upstream and embryonic.
Viewed from one angle, courts’ flattening of the
academic/commercial distinction and the rejection of preferential
treatment for universities is not surprising. Historically, opportunities
for universities to argue for (and for courts to reject) academic
exceptionalism were limited simply because universities were not
significant litigants in the patent system. It is somewhat predictable
that as universities have become more active in litigation, they have
argued for doctrinal interpretations favorable to their interests and
that courts have been skeptical of such claims. After all, the United
States is committed to a unitary patent system that at least nominally
398
treats all inventors and inventions equally. As discussed further

393. See supra notes 312–23 and accompanying text.
394. Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
395. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting an application claiming
ESTs because of a lack of specific and substantial utility).
396. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
397. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
398. As Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have demonstrated, however, the patent
system subtly distinguishes between different inventive fields. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (“[W]e
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below, courts have been largely prudent in rejecting universities’
arguments for preferential interpretations of patentability doctrines,
particularly given the embryonic, upstream nature of many academic
399
inventions. Given this state of affairs, however, it is quite curious
that even though academic exceptionalism has largely died in the
courts, it has adopted new life in the legislative sphere, a development
to which this Article now turns.
IV. STATUTORY INTERNALIZATION AND THE REVIVAL OF
ACADEMIC EXCEPTIONALISM
Turning from doctrine to statute, the twin themes of academic
internalization and exceptionalism take interesting turns in the
context of legislative patent reform. In significant part, the
internalization of academic science within patent law, which started in
doctrine, has reached its apex in the legislative arena. The interests of
academic science, formerly peripheral to the patent system, are now
hardwired in the patent statute. Within this project of “statutory
internalization,” academic exceptionalism has evolved in interesting
ways. On the one hand, academic exceptionalism has been completely
erased to the extent that the interests of academic science help shape
general rules of patentability that apply to all inventions. Such
internalization suggests that there is nothing “exceptional” about
academic science at all. On the other hand, academic exceptionalism
has intensified in the guise of specific statutory carve-outs for
400
universities, thus illustrating classic legislative rent-seeking. The
curious result is that even though courts have rejected academic
exceptionalism, it has achieved new life in Congress.

have noticed an increasing divergence between the rules themselves and the application of the
rules to different industries.”).
399. See infra Part V.B.1.
400. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000). See generally
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D.
Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). Of course, interest-group lobbying is endemic to other
patent legislation as well, including the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. See Edward
R. Ergenzinger Jr., The American Inventor’s Protection Act: A Legislative History, 7 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 146 (2006).
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A. The Bayh-Dole Act
Of course, the primary legislation that intensified universities’
participation in the patent system is the Bayh-Dole Act. As noted
401
above, myriad political and economic factors motivated the Act,
which accelerated the rise in university patenting already underway in
402
1980. This Section extends the earlier discussion by highlighting the
significant involvement of university representatives in securing the
Act’s passage.
University officials were involved throughout the Act’s genesis
and passage. Early in the bill’s drafting, Ralph Davis (patent
administrator from Purdue University), Howard Bremer (a WARF
administrator), and Norman Latker (NIH’s first patent counsel) met
with Senator Birch Bayh and an aid to convince them of the
worthiness of the proposed legislation that would become the Bayh403
Dole Act. In significant part, university officials were motivated to
support the bill because of their positive experiences with patenting
404
federally funded inventions under IPAs. According to Professor
Elizabeth Popp Berman, the “proto-institution” of IPAs helped
establish university patenting as a legitimate activity and galvanized a
professional community of technology transfer administrators around
405
protecting and expanding university patent rights. This professional
community ultimately organized under the rubric of the Association
of University Technology Managers (AUTM), which argued
forcefully in favor of the Bayh-Dole Act and has continued to lobby
406
in favor of university patenting. Among other actions, advocates for
the Act employed an effective political strategy of framing the Act in
407
terms of enhancing U.S. economic competitiveness, thus connecting
the legislation to important national imperatives.

401. See supra notes 168–80 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
403. Berman, supra note 46, at 856.
404. See Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 95
(2004) (describing the testimony of WARF’s Howard Bremer in favor of the proposed
legislation).
405. Berman, supra note 46, at 836; see Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28, at 119.
406. AUTM began as the Society of University Patent Administrators (SUPA) in 1974,
which changed its name in the late 1980s. SUPA members participated in the hearings leading
to the Bayh-Dole Act. See Jon Sandelin, SUPA/AUTM Role in Bayh/Dole Legislation 1, 7–8, 30
BAYH-DOLE, http://b-d30.org/app/webroot/doc/AUTMrole_in_BayhDole.pdf.
407. Berman, supra note 46, at 854.
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Throughout legislative hearings, university representatives
extolled the benefits of vesting title to federally funded patents in
408
universities. For instance, representatives argued that universities
were better conduits for technology transfer than government
agencies because they were more familiar with the inventions at issue
409
and had direct access to faculty inventors. In particular, universities
could facilitate the direct interaction between inventors and licensees
410
that is often critical to technology transfer. Summarizing the
involvement of universities in the bill’s passage, Bremer notes,
“[F]inally universities were speaking with a loud single voice in this
411
arena. I think that is ultimately what carried the day.”
The Bayh-Dole Act represents an important instance of the
statutory internalization of academic science within the patent system.
The Act significantly deepened universities’ participation in patenting
and licensing. On a meta-level, it also represented a political
awakening for universities, thus integrating them within a legislative
system of lobbying Congress for favorable patent legislation, a
practice that universities have continued with fervor.
B. The CREATE Act
Even though the Bayh-Dole Act changed federal policy
governing the ownership of publicly funded patents, it did not change
the general rules of patentability. More recent legislation, however,
has done just that to favor the interests of academic research, further
illustrating the statutory internalization of academic science within
the patent system.
For example, university interests helped change the law of
nonobviousness in the Cooperative Research and Technology
412
Enhancement Act of 2004 (the CREATE Act). Because this
408. Id. at 856.
409. See Government Patent Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive Activities of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th
Cong. 383 (1978) (statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Research
Found.).
410. Id. at 255 (statement of Charles H. Herz, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sci. Found.); id. at 309,
311 (statement of Thomas F. Jones, Vice Pres., Research, Mass. Inst. of Tech.).
411. Berman, supra note 46, at 856 (quoting Interview by Barry Teicher with Howard W.
Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Research Found. (2001) (on file with Univ. of Wis.Madison Oral History Program)).
412. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-453, § 2, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006 & Supp. V
2011)).
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legislation is rather technical, some context is in order. Before the
CREATE Act, Congress had enacted a specific provision in 1984,
413
which was recodified in 1995 at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c), to foster
research, development, and patenting within large corporate
enterprises. In particular, § 103(c) prevented certain types of
nonpublic subject matter from serving as “prior art” that could render
a later claimed invention obvious when the subject matter and the
invention were “owned by the same person or subject to an obligation
414
of assignment to the same person.” In the absence of such a safe
harbor, certain nonpublic information generated by one research
team within an organization (such as Merck) might constitute prior
art that would render obvious the claimed inventions of other
research teams within the same organization. In 1995, however, the
Federal Circuit held that the § 103(c) safe harbor did not apply to
researchers from different organizations working pursuant to a joint
415
research agreement. Among other implications, this holding denied
the benefit of the § 103(c) safe harbor to university scientists and
corporate scientists who worked together under a joint research
agreement with no obligation to assign their inventions to a common
entity. Without this safe harbor, the work of one party to a joint
research agreement could render obvious the inventions of another
party to that same agreement.
To ameliorate this situation, Congress enacted the CREATE
Act, which extended the prior art safe harbor to joint research
416
agreements.
The CREATE Act thus changed the law of
nonobviousness by establishing that certain forms of nonpublic
information would not count as prior art for nonobviousness in the
context of a joint research agreement. Significantly, Congress enacted
the CREATE Act in large part to promote university-industry
417
research collaborations. In introducing the CREATE Act, Senator
Orrin Hatch stated:
413. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 1, 98 Stat. 3383, 3384,
amended by Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat 351, 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(c) (Supp. I 1996)).
414. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
415. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
416. See CREATE Act § 2, 35 U.S.C. § 103(c), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285.
417. See Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2795] (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis.
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This bill makes a narrow, but important change in our patent laws to
ensure that the American public will benefit from the results of
collaborative research efforts that combine the erudition of great
public universities with the entrepreneurial savvy of private
enterprises. . . . [W]e must encourage—not discourage—public
institutions and private entrepreneurs to combine their respective
418
talents in joint research efforts.

Similarly, Senator Patrick Leahy specifically linked the CREATE Act
to the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act: “When Congress passed the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the law encouraged private entities and notfor-profits such as universities to form collaborative partnerships in
419
order to spur innovation.” Members of Congress intended the
CREATE Act to facilitate even more of these partnerships (thus
further integrating universities and commercial interests) by altering
the rules of nonobviousness. Indeed, the CREATE Act has enhanced
the importance of joint research agreements between universities and
420
industry. Far from being on the periphery of the patent system,
interests related to academic science are now helping to determine
general rules of patentability. As we will see, this trend finds even
greater expression in the America Invents Act.
C. The America Invents Act
The statutory internalization of academic science within patent
law has reached its zenith with the America Invents Act (AIA). In
2011, after six years of debate, Congress enacted the AIA, the most
421
sweeping patent reform since the modern patent act of 1952 and
arguably the most significant reform since the establishment of an
422
examination system in 1836. The AIA covers an enormous amount
of subject matter, and the interests of academic science are reflected
in several provisions. In some sense, the formative influence of

Alumni Research Foundation) (“Science today depends on collaborative research, and the
CREATE Act will stimulate numerous inventive activities in the future.”); James G. McEwen,
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Overview of the Patent Reform Act of 2005, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 62 (2005) (discussing the CREATE Act).
418. 150 CONG. REC. 3999 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
419. Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
420. Greenbaum, supra note 18, at 364; see Bagley, supra note 37, at 228 (noting that “many
researchers receive study funding from industry sources”).
421. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
422. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21
FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2012).
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academic interests within the AIA represents a complete inversion of
academic exceptionalism. Such internalization suggests that the
interests of the university community are no longer “exceptional” and
that they may legitimately inform general rules of patentability that
apply to all inventions.
1. First-Inventor-To-File-or-Disclose. The influence of academic
science is greatest in the most prominent reform of the AIA, the shift
423
from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file. Nominally, the AIA
shifts the United States from a “first-to-invent” jurisdiction, in which
priority is based on the date of invention, to a “first-to-file”
jurisdiction, in which priority is based on the date of filing a patent
424
application.
Congress made this move to simplify priority
determinations, reduce administrative costs, and harmonize U.S. law
with international norms (virtually all other countries have first-to-file
regimes). As this Article will demonstrate, however, universities
played an instrumental role in ensuring that the AIA does not create
a pure first-to-file system.
Initially, university representatives vehemently opposed the shift
425
to first-to-file. Universities favored the traditional first-to-invent
system in which they could rely on early inventive activities by
academic scientists (who generally keep good records of such
activities) to establish priority vis-à-vis parties who invented later but
filed patent applications earlier. Academic representatives argued
that a “pure” first-to-file system would impose significant costs on
universities, which would have to rush to file expensive patent
applications on all promising technologies to maintain patent rights.
Furthermore, first-to-file conflicted with academic norms of rapid
publication. University scientists often seek to publish their
findings—which
may
include
descriptions
of
patentable
technologies—as soon as possible. Under a pure first-to-file system,
however, any publication prior to filing a patent application destroys
novelty. Such concerns are mitigated in the traditional first-to-invent
system in which novelty is based on the date of invention and in
which the statutory bar regime contains a one-year grace period
during which an inventor can disclose his invention before filing a

423. See id. at 449.
424. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102).
425. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 110, at 101.
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patent application and still maintain patent rights. For all of these
reasons, in 2005 testimony regarding a previous patent reform bill,
managing director of WARF Carl Gulbrandsen argued that “[t]he
first-inventor-to-file proposal would be a hardship for a vast majority
426
of universities.”
Based in significant part on university pressure, the AIA does
not create a pure first-to-file system. Rather, it creates what has been
characterized as a “first inventor-to-file-or-disclose” regime. It retains
vestiges of the older statutory bar system by integrating a one-year
427
grace period within a first-to-file system. Because of this grace
period, certain public disclosures of an invention within one year
before filing a patent application will not destroy that invention’s
428
novelty. The retention of a one-year grace period is rather unique to
the United States; many other jurisdictions have an “absolute
novelty” regime in which any public disclosure of an invention prior
429
to filing a patent application destroys novelty.
The retention of a one-year grace period within a nominal firstto-file system represents a significant concession to university
interests. Not surprisingly, universities played an important role in
430
crafting this regime. Although other stakeholders also advocated for
431
retaining the grace period, universities represented a particularly
vocal and influential group. In hearings from 2005, Charles Phelps,
provost of the University of Rochester, shared his thoughts on behalf
426. Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 29–30 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen,
Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.).
427. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 286 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)).
428. This is one reason why the U.S. system is often called a “first-inventor-to-file system.”
A first inventor who publicly discloses an invention and then files a patent application within
one year will prevail against an earlier filer (but later inventor) who, for example, simply copied
the invention from the prior inventor.
429. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1023, 1032 (2012).
430. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 59 (statement of Carl E.
Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.). In general, universities have
developed a very significant presence on Capitol Hill; between 1998 and 2007, lobby
expenditures by universities increased from $30.8 million to $90.2 million. Jay P. Kesan &
Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1359 tbl.3
(2009). The percentage of lobbying expenditures devoted to intellectual property laws, however,
is unknown and likely relatively low. See id. at 1359.
431. See 157 CONG. REC. S1098 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar)
(“[W]e have heard from stakeholders from across the spectrum—from high tech and life
sciences to universities and small inventors—in support of the transition to the first-to-file
system.”).
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of the Association of American Universities, American Council on
Education, Association of American Medical Colleges, and Council
on Governmental Relations. Phelps explained the importance of
maintaining a grace period for academic inventors, who often publish
their findings immediately and need time to assess whether to patent
432
them. According to Phelps, university groups would support the
transition to first-inventor-to-file only upon retaining a one-year
433
grace period. Maintaining a grace period had long been on the
academic legislative agenda. As far back as 2004, the National
Research Council recommended that the United States retain a grace
period and persuade other countries to adopt one, particularly to
434
accommodate academic patentees.
The resulting one-year grace period is especially beneficial to
academic inventors. As noted, this one-year grace period
accommodates the academic norm of speedy publication. For
example, if a faculty inventor publishes an article describing some
new technology, then files a patent application within one year of
435
publication, she would not defeat her own novelty. Publication
offers a particularly important benefit, for it even protects a patent
applicant against disclosures by independent inventors. Unlike a pure
first-to-file system, the AIA creates a first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose
regime that heavily benefits academic inventors.
The legislative history of the AIA reveals the importance of
university interests in retaining the grace period. Senator Patrick
Leahy, one of the sponsors of the bill, stated that “the first-inventorto-file provisions that are included in the America Invents Act were
drafted with careful attention to the needs of universities and small
436
inventors.” A House committee report similarly notes that “[t]he
Committee heard from universities and small inventors, in particular,
about the importance of maintaining that grace period in our

432. Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75 (2005)
[hereinafter Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing] (statement of
Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester).
433. See id. (“[T]he broad grace period of current law operating in a first inventor to file
system would encourage open communication of research discoveries and preserve a broad
opportunity for the filing of patent applications.”).
434. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 CENTURY 127 (2004).
435. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)).
436. 157 CONG. REC. S1090 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
ST
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437

and goes on to cite testimony from Phelps and
system,”
438
Gulbrandsen, among others.
One must not paint with too broad of a brush, however, and it is
important to acknowledge internal dissent within the university
community regarding the shift to first-inventor-to-file. Notably,
WARF led a consortium of universities in breaking ranks with most
higher-education associations to oppose the AIA, primarily because it
perceived the “safeguards” of the first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose
439
regime to be inadequate. Such concerns were based both on the
lengthy amount of time it takes for academic papers to be published
as well as the uncertainty surrounding the sufficiency of a prior
disclosure that would be necessary to maintain novelty in the first440
inventor-to-file-or-disclose system. Notwithstanding the criticisms of
WARF and its cohorts, the grace period provisions of the AIA were
adopted in significant part to accommodate university interests.
The adoption of a grace period in the new first-inventor-to-file
regime reflects a significant stage in the statutory internalization of
academic science within patent law. As the AIA’s grace period
provisions reveal, the interests of academic science have journeyed to
the center of patent law; a once-marginal activity is now helping to
define general rules of novelty that apply to all inventions. Other
legislative reforms further illustrate the internalization of academic
interests within patent law, though they offer a new twist on the
theme of academic exceptionalism.
2. The Prior User Rights Defense. In other areas of the AIA,
academic interests are manifested not in altering the general rules of
patent law, but in establishing specific carve-outs for academic
entities. In this sense, academic exceptionalism, which courts have
rejected in doctrine, has been resurrected in statute.
For example, universities preferentially benefit from the newly
expanded “prior user rights” defense to patent infringement. In the
441
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Congress established a
437. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 41 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 71.
438. Id.
439. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Several Universities Oppose Pending ‘Patent Reform’
Legislation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/severaluniversities-oppose-pending-patent-reform-legislation/34091.
440. I thank Jacob Rooksby for these helpful observations.
441. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311–318).
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relatively narrow defense to infringement based on one’s prior
commercial use of an invention before another party patented it. For
example, if A reduced to practice a process and (secretly) used it for
over a year before B filed a patent application on it, A could invoke
its prior use as a defense if B sued A for patent infringement.
Although this prior use defense covered parties who engaged in prior
442
“commercial” use of a patented invention, the statute clarified that
the defense extended to “activities performed by a nonprofit research
laboratory or nonprofit entity such as a university, research center, or
443
hospital” as long as these activities aimed to benefit the public. The
prior user rights defense thus applied to a university that used an
invention for a year before it was patented by another party. Notably,
this provision reflects an instance of statutory academic
exceptionalism, as Congress stretched the definition of “commercial
use” to encompass use by universities. This defense was rather
narrow, however, as it only applied to alleged infringement of certain
444
patented business methods.
With the AIA, Congress expanded the prior user rights defense
beyond patented business methods to patented processes more
generally. Universities accused of infringement fully benefit from this
expanded defense, for the AIA preserves the notion that prior
“[n]onprofit laboratory use” constitutes a prior commercial use that
445
relieves a defendant of infringement liability. Thus, even though
laboratory use by an academic institution seems to be the opposite of
commercial use, it still qualifies for the “prior commercial use”
defense to patent infringement.
More importantly, under the AIA, university patentees receive
special treatment when infringers attempt to assert the prior user
rights defense against them. In a provision entitled “University
Exception,” the AIA states that a defendant may not invoke the prior
user rights defense if the patent in suit “was, at the time the invention
was made, owned or subject to an obligation of assignment to either
an institution of higher education . . . or a technology transfer
446
organization . . . .” In other words, a defendant may not invoke the
442. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 284, 297 (2011).
443. Id. § 273(a)(2).
444. See id. § 273(a)(3).
445. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 5, 125 Stat. at 297 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §
273(c)(2)).
446. Id., 125 Stat. at 298 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A)) (emphasis added).
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prior user rights defense when sued by a university for patent
447
infringement. This, of course, greatly and asymmetrically benefits
448
university patentees.
Not surprisingly, university representatives were quite influential
449
in securing this preferential treatment.
Originally, university
representatives argued against expanding the prior user rights
exception because of the belief that such a defense would encourage
protecting patentable inventions as trade secrets, which would
450
WARF in particular
negatively impact academic institutions.
451
opposed any categorical expansion of prior user rights. Academic
representatives would only support expanding the prior use rights
defense if it contained special accommodations for university
452
patentees. Exercising their political muscle, universities helped
453
secure preferential treatment in the AIA.

447. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 71 (2011) reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 96
(“H.R. 1249 would prohibit public and private entities from using the prior-use defense to
patent infringement claims for business processes brought by a university or technology-transfer
organization.”).
448. See Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded
Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 953–54 (2012) (“The privileged position universities and
their assignees and/or licensees now hold in patent litigation, even against prior, independent
commercializers, makes proper information as to whether those patents involved federal
funding even more important.”).
449. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 44, reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 75 (“This
narrow expansion of prior-user rights balances the interests of patent holders, including
universities, against the legitimate concerns of businesses that want to avoid infringement suits
relating to processes that they developed and used prior to another party acquiring related
patents.” (emphasis added)).
450. See Hearing on H.R. 2795, supra note 417, at 29 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen,
Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.); Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages:
Hearing, supra note 380, at 101 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni
Research Found.); Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing, supra
note 432, at 73 (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester).
451. See Briefing Paper, Wis. Alumni Research Found., U.S. Patent Reform and the Case
Against Expansion of Prior User Rights (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://democrats.judiciary.
house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/WARF110413.pdf (“Now, as
patent reform legislation nears completion, an attempt by proponents of prior user rights has
been made to turn back the clock and enact language that would benefit a few at the expense of
society.”).
452. See Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing, supra note 380, at 101
(statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.) (“Prior user
rights establish a general defense against infringement. WARF opposed the proposed
expansion.”).
453. See Memorandum from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of Am. Univs., Molly
Corbett Broad, President, Am. Council on Educ., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO, Ass’n of
Am. Med. Colls. & M. Peter McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. & Land-grant Univs., to Ass’n
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3. Micro Entity Status. Finally, the AIA exhibits a rather blatant
example of academic exceptionalism by lowering fees for patent
applicants under an obligation to assign or license their applications
454
to universities. Again, this represents a new (and rather explicit)
model of academic exceptionalism based in statute rather than
doctrine. Under the AIA, such applicants qualify for “micro entity”
status and are thus eligible for a 75 percent reduction in fees.
Although the name suggests that micro entities are individuals or
small firms, this is a misnomer, as the micro entity categorization also
encompasses inventors at institutions of higher education.
The political horse-trading at the heart of this provision is rather
apparent in its legislative history. In March 2011, Senator Harry Reid
offered an amendment to the micro entity provision that would have
extended such status to public universities participating in a program
aimed at benefitting institutions deemed to be receiving an
455
inadequate share of federal research and development funds.
Senators from states with universities not participating in this
program objected, and eventually the Senate voted to extend micro
456
entity status to all public universities.
In the House of
Representatives, objections from private universities led members of
Congress to expand micro entity status to all institutions of higher
457
education, both public and private. In this manner, university
458
interests won a significant reduction of patent fees in the AIA. Not
459
460
461
research institutions,
TTOs,
and
surprisingly, universities,

Constituencies, Support H.R. 1249, the America Invents Act 2 (June 14, 2011), http://judiciary.
house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/AAU%20ACE%20AAMC%20APLU.pdf.
454. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 319 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 123(d)).
455. See Matal, supra note 422, at 495.
456. See id.
457. See id. at 496.
458. Universities won preferential treatment in other areas of the AIA as well. See LeahySmith America Invents Act § 4, 125 Stat. at 294 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 115(d)) (allowing
patent applicants (such as universities) to file a substitute statement when an inventor does not
execute the ordinarily required oath); id. § 13(a), 125 Stat. at 327 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §
202(c)(7)(E)(i)) (increasing royalties that universities can retain from licensing inventions at
government-owned, contractor-operated research facilities); H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43
(2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 73 (noting that the AIA preserves the intent of the
CREATE Act to promote joint research activities and subtly expanding its reach).
459. Comment from Rockefeller Univ., to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Comment on
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Volume 77, Number 104, May 30, 2012
Changes to Implement Micro Entity Status for Paying Patent Fees (July 3, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/me_rockefeller_03jul2012.pdf.
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organizations such as the Association of American Universities, the
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, the Association of
American Medical Colleges, and the Council on Governmental
462
Relations all actively contributed to rulemaking governing this
special treatment for universities. Ultimately, preferential treatment
for universities—previously peripheral players in the patent system—
is now hardwired in patent statutes and regulations.
V. ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENTS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS
A. The Mutual Internalization of Academic Science and Patent Law
and the Evolution of Academic Exceptionalism
Historically segregated, academic science and patent law have
over the past several decades engaged in a process of mutual
internalization. Along the way, academic exceptionalism has evolved
considerably. In the early to mid-twentieth century, academic
researchers largely adhered to scientific norms that eschewed patents,
and universities’ early forays into the patent system were marked by
uniquely academic, noncommercial values. For its part, patent law
exhibited academic exceptionalism by excluding the fruits of
academic science and sometimes treating academic entities differently
than ordinary commercial actors. Due to a host of developments
culminating in the late twentieth century, however, patents began to
463
permeate academic culture.
Contemporary universities have
460. Comment from Priti Phukan & Thomas Fitting, Office of Patent Counsel, Scripps Inst.,
to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Comments on Proposed Rule Making—Micro Entity Status
(June 21, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/me_fitting_21jun2012.
pdf.
461. Comment from Dale Zetocha, Exec. Dir., N.D. State Univ. Research Found., to U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, Comments Provided in Response to “Changes to Implement Micro
Entity Status for Paying Patent Fees” from Vol. 77, N. 104 of the Federal Register, in Reference
to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (June 21, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
comments/me_ndsurf_27jul2012.pdf.
462. See Comment from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of Am. Univs., Peter
McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. & Land-grant Univs., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO,
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. & Anthony P. DeCrappeo, President, Council on Governmental
Relations, to James Engel, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Admin., Office of the
Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, Changes to Implement Micro Entity Status for
Paying Patent Fees (RIN 0651-AC78) (July 27, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
comments/me_aau_27jul2012.pdf.
463. This transformation has been particularly stark in the life sciences. Whereas
universities were historically wary of profiting from health technologies, biomedical research
has been a site of intensive patenting in contemporary times. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 28,
at 786.
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internalized patents, and the patent system has internalized university
science. Nowadays, university inventors and inventions are frequent
subjects of patent doctrine, and courts perceive little difference
between universities and profit-oriented actors in the patent system.
Based in part on the increasingly commercial tenor of university
patenting,
courts
have
systematically
rejected
academic
exceptionalism in patent doctrine. The internalization of academic
science has reached its zenith with legislative patent reform, in which
the interests of academic science held much sway. On the one hand,
academic exceptionalism has vanished to the extent that the interests
of academic science now inform general rules of patentability. On the
other hand, academic exceptionalism has been reborn in statute, the
product of legislative rent-seeking by universities.
Although the shifting normative status of universities has helped
drive these developments, it is important to recognize other
contributing factors as well. Focusing on patent doctrine,
contemporary courts’ rejection of academic exceptionalism is part
and parcel of broader structural trends in patent law. As a historical
matter, the sharp rise in university patenting—and courts’ rejection of
academic exceptionalism—has coincided with the tenure of the
Federal Circuit. Given this court’s mission to unify patent law and
464
make it more consistent, a project of eliminating preferential
treatment for a particular set of institutions is not surprising. Even
though this unifying tendency may contribute to the Federal Circuit’s
rejection of academic exceptionalism, however, the changing
normative status of universities remains quite relevant. The Federal
Circuit has frequently referenced the commercial nature of modern
university patenting in rejecting any preferential treatment for such
institutions. Furthermore, the rejection of academic exceptionalism is
not unique to the Federal Circuit: the Supreme Court and district
courts have also rejected preferential treatment for universities as
well.
In many ways, the developments described here reflect increased
aggressiveness on the part of universities in multiple contexts. First,
university research has become more scientifically aggressive, shifting
from passively observing nature to actively manipulating the building
blocks of life. The development of monoclonal antibodies and
recombinant DNA technology, and the concomitant rise of
464. See Dreyfuss, supra note 201, at 7 (“[C]hannelling patent cases into a single appellate
forum would create a stable, uniform law . . . .”).
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biotechnology, ushered in an era in which the fruits of academic
research increasingly cross the threshold to qualify as patentable
inventions. Second, universities became more commercially
aggressive as they sought to realize (and enlarge) profits from
intellectual property. Third, universities became more politically
aggressive as they turned to the legislative process to consolidate their
gains from technology transfer. Now that universities have become
entrenched within the patent system, they have wielded their political
might to help regulate the legal framework that regulates them. In
other areas of intellectual property law, parties have invoked the
465
trope of the “romantic author” to justify stronger protection.
Somewhat analogously, representatives of academia have invoked the
rhetorical trope of the “romantic university” to justify preferential
treatment under the patent laws. Although universities may indeed
possess some unique characteristics, in many ways, this behavior
simply reveals that universities act like typical rent-seeking
institutions in both the economic and political spheres.
Ultimately, these developments help define a narrative of
466
reciprocity between norms and law. Historically, relations between
universities and the patent system were marked by a stable
equilibrium in which university scientists rarely patented their
discoveries and the patent system regarded universities—in their
limited interactions—through the lens of academic exceptionalism.
Later, legal changes such as the Bayh-Dole Act and Chakrabarty
helped usher universities more deeply into the patent system. Once
there, universities began to behave more like commercial entities,
thus losing their special normative status. In an iterative fashion, the
patent system responded to its own creation by highlighting the
increasingly commercial nature of universities and rejecting academic
exceptionalism. And in strictly construing rules regarding priority and
prior art, courts interpreting patent doctrine actually pushed
universities to act more like commercial entities. Universities, eager
to consolidate their newfound gains, turned to the legislative sphere

465. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY x–xiii (1996) (noting that invocations of the
“romantic author” have contributed to a proliferation of intellectual property rights); Keith
Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1333–38 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:
The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 456.
466. See Rai, supra note 7, at 84 (describing the dynamic relationship between norms and
law).
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to shape patent reform, thus fully integrating academic science into
the fabric of patent law.
B. Assessments and Prescriptions
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article
returns to the question of whether and how the patent system should
treat universities differently than other actors. Given the patent
system’s historical commitment to a unitary system that treats all
parties equally, the burden of persuasion rests on those who would
extend special treatment to academic entities. In theory, however,
social welfare concerns may justify such exceptionalism; as Professor
Margo Bagley notes, “Some may question whether university
inventors should receive special treatment in the patent system. The
answer is they should not, unless special treatment will inure to the
467
public good.” This Article argues that universities are sufficiently
unique actors in the patent system that they warrant differential
treatment in some, but not all, contexts.
In important ways, the question of how universities should
interact with the patent system depends on one’s normative vision of
universities in society. As mentioned earlier, there is great diversity
468
among academic institutions. The norms, histories, and missions of
public versus private, secular versus religious, and land-grant versus
non-land-grant institutions may lead to different visions about a
university’s role in society and how patenting and technology transfer
469
advance (or do not advance) that role. Such institutional missions
should arise through processes of self-governance based on
consultation with relevant stakeholders. In general, however,
universities as a whole occupy a distinct and discrete role in society as
nonprofit institutions committed to advancing knowledge, teaching
students, and serving their respective communities. As a descriptive
and normative matter, universities are different in important ways
from the typical commercial entities that fall within the regulatory
grasp of the patent system. It is within this very broad normative
framework that this Article offers the assessments and prescriptions
that follow.

467. Bagley, supra note 37, at 265.
468. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
469. See Lee, supra note 216, at 2234–35 (noting a high degree of diversity among
universities and approaches to technology transfer).
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The question of how the patent system should regulate university
science is further complicated in several ways. First, the patent system
is not a monolithic entity but is instead comprised of a constellation of
regulatory forces including courts, Congress, the USPTO, funding
agencies, and civil society. Second and relatedly, regulation can take
the form of hard law as well as more informal soft regulation (such as
through the lever of federal research funding) or even public
pressure. Third, universities intersect with the patent system in
different ways, for example as patentees (and enforcers), licensors,
and infringers. As an overarching principle, this Article argues that
the right regulatory approach will vary based on context.
As suggested above, this analysis proceeds on the principle that
academic exceptionalism in the abstract is neither categorically good
nor bad. The key inquiry—which is an admittedly difficult one—is
recognizing when exceptional treatment is warranted because
differential rules for university research serve broader social
470
interests. In most contexts, general rules of patent law should apply
without exception to academic entities. Thus, for example, this
Article argues against any preferential treatment for universities in
the basic requirements of patentability; in this manner, among other
implications, existing doctrine can usefully constrain universities’
ability to patent upstream, embryonic inventions. In the remedies
context, courts should carefully exercise their equitable discretion to
deny injunctions to university patentees in certain circumstances, thus
enhancing access to academic technologies. Turning to soft
regulation, federal funding agencies should leverage the power of the
purse to encourage more progressive patenting and licensing
decisions by patentees. In some instances, public policy objectives
counsel in favor of extending preferential treatment to universities,
for example, by providing a more robust experimental use exemption
so that noncommercial academic research may proceed relatively
unimpeded.
1. Patentability. As discussed above, academic patentees have
occasionally argued to relax various requirements of patentability,
such as the definition of diligence and the written description

470. And, of course, when policy objectives counsel in favor of academic exceptionalism,
such exceptionalism may take the form of disparate treatment that either advances or
contravenes universities’ own articulated preferences.
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471

for university inventions. They have sometimes
requirement,
supported their arguments by citing the Bayh-Dole Act, which (they
contend) demonstrates Congress’s endorsement of university
patenting and technology transfer. For a variety of reasons, however,
courts and Congress should not relax the requirements of
patentability for academic inventions.
First, although selectively relaxing patentability requirements
would increase academic patenting, there is no evidence that the
number of patents owned by universities is suboptimal. If anything,
commentators suggest that universities are obtaining too many
patents, thus creating potentially deleterious anticommons regimes
472
and patent thickets. Many university inventions, such as some
research tools, can achieve widespread dissemination and
commercialization without patents. Approached from a different
angle, if universities were particularly good stewards of inventions,
there might be a plausible policy argument for selectively relaxing
patentability requirements to increase the number of university
patents. However, there is little indication that universities are
particularly effective or enlightened stewards of technology. As seen
in cases involving human embryonic stem cells, cotransformation, and
genes related to breast cancer, universities have exhibited many of
the same rent-seeking, self-interested tendencies as commercial
473
entities. And in the cases of COX-2 inhibitors and NF-kB, patents
did not facilitate technology transfer so much as allow universities
and their licensees to sue manufacturers who were already developing
474
useful products.
Second, relaxing patentability requirements for universities
would have deleterious effects on the kind of inventions patented by
academic institutions. In particular, relaxing patentable subject

471. See supra notes 325–32, 343–61 and accompanying text.
472. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (“[P]rivatization can go
astray when too many owners hold rights in previous discoveries that constitute obstacles to
future research.”).
473. As noted above, however, universities have sometimes made patented inventions
widely available to the research community. See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text.
Some commercial firms do this as well, however.
474. Cf. Nelson, supra note 295, at 16. As these examples demonstrate, the “problem” of
overreaching in academic patenting may be addressed through restricting general doctrines of
patentability. However, doctrinal modification represents a rather blunt instrument, and a more
targeted intervention would involve influencing the particular patenting and licensing decisions
of individual university patentees. See infra Part V.B.2.
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matter, utility, enablement, or written description requirements
would permit more embryonic, upstream technologies to qualify for
patenting. This would not be a welcome development. To be sure,
Professor Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory” famously defends broad
475
patents on early stage technological prospects. According to this
view, allowing a single patentee to coordinate technological
development prevents wasteful races for patents and duplicative
476
effort. There are indeed conceptual parallels between prospect
theory and the Bayh-Dole Act, both of which contemplate a single
entity (for example, a university) managing the development of an
early stage technology. Commentators, however, have challenged the
propriety of early, broad patents on technological prospects,
particularly when rivalry and competition in innovation markets has
been
extremely
effective
in
driving
invention
and
477
commercialization.
Ultimately, allowing patents on overly
embryonic inventions would be counterproductive both because of
the significant effort that would still be required to create commercial
products and because of the potential for broad patents to stymie
478
multiple avenues of technological development.
Third, strategic considerations also weigh against relaxing the
standards of patentability for academic inventions. If universities
qualified for special treatment, commercial entities could easily game
this distinction by sponsoring research at universities and then
exclusively licensing any resulting patented inventions. Such
gamesmanship would erode whatever social value preferential
treatment for academic inventions was intended to generate.
Turning from the rules of patentability to patent fees, the AIA’s
extension of micro entity status to universities, which qualifies
academic patentees for lower fees, is also unwarranted. First, as
noted, there is little empirical evidence suggesting that universities
are not patenting enough. Second, although university scientists are
the named inventors on patent applications, they typically do not pay

475. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977).
476. Id.
477. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 135–41 (2004); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 872–77 (1990).
478. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (articulating a concern that a
patent on a process of producing compounds of no known utility could “block off whole areas of
scientific development”).
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patent fees; that responsibility falls to universities (more specifically,
TTOs), many of which are rather macro, well-heeled institutions.
Third, many sophisticated TTOs identify a prospective licensee to
cover patent fees before initiating prosecution. In such cases,
subsidizing university patent applications might actually chill this
favorable screening practice. There appears to be little principled
reason for extending lower fees to academic patentees, which reflects
479
blatant legislative rent-seeking on the part of universities.
Even though courts and Congress should resist favoring
universities in the requirements of patentability, general reforms to
patent law informed by the unique needs of academic research are
not necessarily problematic. First, the CREATE Act’s extension of
480
the § 103(c) safe harbor to joint research agreements fosters
partnerships between university and industrial scientists while helping
to preserve the patentability of resulting inventions. Although such
collaborations give rise to concerns over the commercialization of
academia, they also serve as valuable conduits for transferring
481
academic technical knowledge to the private sector (and vice versa).
Second, the AIA’s establishment of a first-inventor-to-file-or-disclose
system rather than a true first-inventor-to-file system represents good
policy. Maintaining a one-year grace period is particularly congruent
with academic norms of rapid publication and may decrease the
chilling effects that patenting would otherwise exert on academic
discourse. The rub here, however, arises not from academic
exceptionalism, but from American exceptionalism. The value of the
United States’s one-year grace period is severely limited to the extent
that most other jurisdictions maintain systems closer to pure firstinventor-to-file regimes. Thus, if a university seeks patent rights on a
technology in multiple jurisdictions (which will be the case for the
vast majority of technologies of commercial importance), then it must
482
abide by the more stringent first-to-file rules of those countries.
479. See, e.g., Micro-Entity Status: Can We All Qualify?, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 26, 2012,
3:31 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/micro-entity-status-can-we-all-qualify.html
(quoting independent inventor Raoul Drapeau).
480. See supra notes 412–20 and accompanying text.
481. Lee, supra note 303, at 1549–51.
482. An academic inventor who discloses an invention and then files for a patent within one
year will be able to obtain a patent in the United States because of the one-year grace period.
However, she will not be able to obtain patent rights in other jurisdictions that follow an
absolute novelty regime with no grace period. Thus, for all commercially valuable inventions
with a potential global market, a prudent patentee should not engage in any public disclosure
prior to filing a patent application.
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2. Remedies. With respect to enforcement, an important issue is
the appropriate remedy that university patentees should obtain upon
successfully asserting their patents. In eBay, the Supreme Court
clarified that university patentees should not be categorically
excluded from obtaining injunctive relief, even though they do not
483
manufacture any products. In exercising their equitable discretion,
however, courts should be mindful of the unique role of universities
as nonprofit, public-interest institutions as well as the individual
circumstances of technology transfer. In some cases, the absence of
irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, balance of hardships,
and public interest may counsel against granting an injunction, and
ongoing royalties may be sufficient to compensate the university for
infringement. In particular, for the subset of university inventions that
arise from federal funding, it would be helpful for courts to consider
the policy aims of the Bayh-Dole Act in their injunction analyses.
Given that federal funds have satisfied the incentive to invent such
technologies, injunctive relief is best justified based on providing
incentives to develop an invention into a commercial product. Courts
should consider whether exclusive rights are necessary to serve this
function when a plaintiff asserts a university patent. In some cases,
patented university technologies achieve wide commercialization
484
despite the patent, thus calling into question whether an injunction
would truly serve the public interest.
3. Decisions to Obtain and License Patents. As illustrated in
various case studies above, problematic instances of academic
patenting arise not simply from liberal doctrines of patentability, but
from universities’ specific decisions to patent particular technologies
(as opposed to leaving them in the public domain) and license them
restrictively. Notably, although the Bayh-Dole Act allows universities
to patent federally funded inventions, it does not require them to do
so; universities maintain significant discretion regarding whether to
seek exclusive rights and how to assert them. Accordingly, although
courts and Congress should resist modifying general rules of
patentability either in favor of or against university inventions, soft
regulation can bear valuable fruit in shaping individual university

483. See supra Part III.B.2.e.
484. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
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patenting and licensing practices. As demonstrated above, some
universities have exploited their discretion in publicly spirited ways,
declining to patent technologies that do not require additional private
investment for exploitation or licensing patents at lower rates for
noncommercial versus commercial uses. Government intervention
can help encourage and expand these practices. Whereas legal
doctrine and statutory reforms are rather blunt instruments for
guiding patenting and licensing decisions, funding agencies can utilize
the power of the purse to influence academic grantees in a more
targeted, contextually sensitive manner.
Indeed, agencies like NIH have put strings on government
485
money to influence universities’ patenting and licensing practices.
For instance, NIH has discouraged grant recipients from patenting
DNA sequences within the Human Genome Project and has
encouraged (if not required) grantees to widely license patented
486
research tools for academic investigation. Furthermore, it has issued
487
guidance for licensing research tools and genomic inventions and
offered recommendations regarding corporate sponsors’ control over
488
academic scientists. Funding agencies, which possess technical
expertise and do not directly profit from government-financed
patents, should continue to help shape university patenting and
licensing practices to serve the public interest.
Agencies, however, can do more. In particular, NIH has been
notoriously reluctant to exercise rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to
489
enhance access to federally funded inventions. These mechanisms—
particularly march-in rights—have great potential to enhance access
to federally funded inventions for research and healthcare purposes,
485. Indeed, the Supreme Court has tacitly recognized that funding agencies may influence
the behavior of grantees. Cf. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at 2199 (“Agencies that grant funds to federal
contractors typically expect those contractors to obtain assignments [of patents from
inventors].”).
486. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 279, at 928–29; NHGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property
of Human Genome Sequence, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 9, 1996),
http://www.genome.gov/10000926.
487. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg.
18,413, 18,413–15 (Apr. 11, 2005); Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research
Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final
Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999); NIH Policy on Sharing of Model
Organisms for Biomedical Research, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (May 7, 2004), http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-04-042.html.
488. See Cristina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research
After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1567 (2004).
489. See Lee, supra note 283, at 951–55.
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but NIH has rarely exploited them. Part of the difficulty lies in the
Act’s relatively high standards for instituting these mechanisms. In
this regard, the findings of this Article support the proposal of
Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg to modify the Bayh-Dole
Act to allow funding agencies more flexibility to determine whether
490
and how universities patent and license federally funded inventions.
4. Universities as Infringers. Turning from universities as
patentees to potential infringers, this Article identifies one context in
which social welfare concerns favor academic exceptionalism. In this
regard, this Article joins others in arguing for an experimental use
exception to patent infringement for nonprofit university
491
researchers.
Although universities increasingly behave like
commercial entities, there is still much social value to academic
492
research unfettered by patent constraints. Even though early fears
493
of a tragedy of the anticommons in biomedical research have not
materialized (particularly toward the upstream end of scientific
research), the potential for exclusive rights to inhibit productive
494
activity persists. In some ways, an experimental use exception would
simply safeguard the current state of affairs in which patentees almost
never sue university researchers for infringement, and university

490. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 310–13. The case for discouraging university
patents on software is particularly strong given the relatively low development costs of such
inventions. See Rai et al., supra note 254, at 1550.
491. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 107, at 471–72 (advancing a waiver proposal); Mueller,
supra note 137, at 54–57 (arguing for a liability-rule model to allow nonconsensual
“development use” of patented research tools that are not readily available); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 535
(2008) [hereinafter Strandburg, Users as Innovators] (advocating a “double-edged sword”
research exception); Strandburg, supra note 137, at 138–44 (proposing a delayed compulsory
license regime for research tools).
492. See Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 491, at 503 (“It is in society’s interest to
have research performed by the quickest and most effective researchers.”). It should be
acknowledged that an experimental use exception may also benefit commercial firms,
particularly if those firms sponsor research at universities with the aim of exploiting the
exception and then licensing any resulting inventions arising from that research. Although
policymakers can monitor such situations, they need not be particularly troubling if the “quasicommercial” research still has significant academic value and does not significantly erode the
incentives of patentees.
493. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 472, at 698.
494. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking
the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1080–84 (2008) (identifying
several negative effects on university research).
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Not surprisingly,
researchers rarely attempt to clear patents.
496
university representatives
as well as organizations supporting
497
academic research, such as the National Research Council, have
called for an experimental use exception.
A thorny question, however, is the precise mechanism by which
such an experimental use exception would arise, an issue upon which
498
scholars have offered detailed proposals. The most promising
approach would take the form of a statutory amendment to the
Patent Act. In this regard, it bears mentioning that many other
499
countries have formally codified an experimental use exception. As
Professor Katherine Strandburg argues, such a statute should
distinguish between “experimenting on” and “experimenting with”
500
patented technologies; the former certainly appears to be wellqualified for a research exception. Given the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Madey, an ex ante experimental use exception is unlikely
to arise in doctrine. However, an intermediate, ex post approach may
emerge from remedies analysis. As I have argued elsewhere, courts
should utilize eBay’s equitable flexibility to consider denying
injunctive relief when a university scientist infringes an
“infrastructural” patent, the exploitation of which promises
501
significant social benefits relative to costs. Although this approach
would provide less ex ante certainty to would-be infringers, it may be
a more palatable intervention for patentees, as it provides
compensation and thus maintains incentives to invent and
commercialize.
CONCLUSION
Patents and the university, once operating at each other’s
peripheries, have moved into each other’s cores. This Article has
traced the twin trends of academic internalization and exceptionalism
within patent law. Before the late twentieth century, academic science
495. Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary
Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2266 (2009).
496. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing, supra
note 432, at 11 (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Provost, Univ. of Rochester).
497. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 434, at 82.
498. See supra note 491.
499. See Strandburg, supra note 137, at 89 (including Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Japan).
500. Id. at 88–89.
501. Lee, supra note 120, at 102–09.
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was largely peripheral to the patent system. However, as academic
science has grown more aggressive and as universities have vastly
increased their patenting activities, academic research and practices
have frequently become the subject of patent doctrine. Courts,
responding to normative and behavioral changes on the part of
universities, now view academic science as fully integrated into the
commercial narrative of the patent system. The internalization of
academic science within patent law has reached its zenith in
legislative patent reform, as the interests of university research are
now hardwired in statute.
Along the way, academic exceptionalism has evolved
considerably. Up until the late twentieth century, patent courts, citing
traditional academic norms, erected barriers between universities and
the patent system and occasionally extended differential treatment to
academic institutions. As universities began to embrace commercial
norms, practices, and policies, however, contemporary patent courts
have rejected academic exceptionalism. Whereas academic
exceptionalism died in the courts, it has been resurrected in statute, as
universities have wielded their political power to secure preferential
treatment in recent patent reform legislation.
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Article has
argued that in certain contexts, university research does indeed
warrant special treatment in the patent system. Courts have been
correct to reject universities’ attempts to relax standards of
patentability, but they should consider the unique circumstances of
university patenting and technology transfer in determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief. Federal funding agencies should
utilize soft regulation to guide universities’ patenting and licensing
decisions to serve the public interest. One area in which academic
exceptionalism is warranted is infringement, where an experimental
use exception can ensure that valuable scientific research proceeds
uninhibited by patents. Through combining various hard and soft
regulatory mechanisms, the patent system can better regulate and
unleash the enormous innovative potential of the modern research
university.

